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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores whether established methods from human reliability analysis 
and accident investigation can be applied early in system development to identify the 
design vulnerabilities that increase risk of system failure. Human reliability analyses 
evaluate performance shaping factors to quantify the likelihood of human failure before an 
accident occurs. Mishap investigations performed after an accident identify both human 
contributions to the system’s failure and recommendations to avoid human failures in the 
future. This thesis proposes a method to evaluate system resiliency to variations in human 
performance and estimate the likelihood of human error. This method begins with 
functional analysis and failure mode analysis for a system concept, and then proposes two 
questionnaires based on human reliability and accident investigation criteria. This method 
is intended for the requirements development phase before system requirements are 
finalized and system design prototypes are completed. A demonstration of this method 
evaluates the human role using the electronic chart display and information system. Results 
from the demonstration reveal the two dominant factors that increase human error 
probability. The thesis concludes with an examination of the method’s performance and 
results in support of validation of the method. Follow-on work is proposed to conduct a 
human subjects experiment for further validation and verification of the method. 
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Accident investigations result in specific and actionable recommendations to 
address human factors. The review of Navy collisions in 2017 found a number of 
engineering and procedural contributors including design of helm controls and failure to 
continuously apply operational risk management (Davidson 2017). This thesis proposes 
that design vulnerabilities similar to those found during mishap investigations can be 
identified before accidents occur. 
The research question for this thesis explores whether established methods from 
human reliability analysis and accident investigation can be applied early in system 
development to identify the design vulnerabilities that increase risk of system failure. These 
methods focus on the human-machine interactions that are critical to total system 
performance. This method is intended to be applied before system requirements are 
finalized and system design prototypes are completed. The method begins with functional 
analysis and failure mode analysis for a system concept, then proposes two questionnaires 
based on human reliability and accident investigation criteria.  
The proposed method, concept review using Standardized Plant Analysis Risk–
Human (SPAR-H)/Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
(CRUSH), is an eight-step process that leads a multi-disciplinary team through a series of 
analyses to determine the operator actions and decisions to be evaluated. The SPAR-H and 
HFACS methods each provide a different point of view to the system designer. The 
HFACS results indicate the impact on system performance in the event of human error. 
The SPAR-H results quantify the likelihood of a human error. Both consequence and 
likelihood are needed to describe risk. The CRUSH process concludes with a review of 
results by the multi-disciplinary team of analysts and the formation of recommendations 
based on the insights gained from examining system resiliency and the likelihood of human 
error. 
The CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire presents HFACS concepts summarizing each 
major HFACS category: unsafe acts, preconditions, supervisory actions, and organizational 
xviii 
influences. The CRUSH Step 6 questionnaire presents SPAR-H factors for evaluation in 
the context of HFACS categories, subcategories, and nanocodes. The result of CRUSH 
Step 6 is not only the human error probability for a specific operator action or decision, but 
the multipliers for each of the eight factors that contribute to the human error probability. 
The recommendations formed in CRUSH Step 8 highlight the areas where the human error 
probability can be reduced through system design decisions. 
A demonstration of the CRUSH process uses the Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System (ECDIS) as the system of interest. The ECDIS is currently used by 
commercial mariners and the U.S. Navy to assist with safe navigation. The demonstration 
accomplishes all eight steps of the process to verify that the method was usable and to 
validate that the method provided results that were similar to findings from investigation 
reports from maritime accidents involving navigation. The findings of the demonstration 
are that ECDIS system performance is affected by the single ECDIS operator with 
additional influence from organizational pressures, and that human-machine interface and 
operator experience are the two dominant factors that increase human error probability. 
Follow-on work is proposed to conduct a human subjects experiment for further validation 
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The focus of this thesis is on incorporating aspects of the human reliability analysis 
and mishap analysis into a methodology applied early in system development. Human 
reliability analysis and accident investigation methods both focus on the human-machine 
interactions that are critical to total system performance. This thesis proposes a method to 
evaluate system resiliency to variations in human performance and estimate the likelihood 
of human error. The proposed method is intended to be applied during the requirements 
development phase before system requirements are finalized and system design prototypes 
are completed. The proposed method is demonstrated on a naval system to uncover design 
vulnerabilities that increase risk of system failure. The demonstration serves as a proof of 
concept to (1) verify whether the new method adds additional insight to the design process 
by identifying previously unknown risks; and, (2) validate whether the new methodology 
offers useful input to the design effort. Of the four types of thesis research methods 
described by Giachetti (2016), this thesis is an analysis thesis. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can established methods for identifying and quantifying contributors to human 
error be applied to the development of new Navy systems for improving the human 
reliability of operators and maintainers?  
B. MOTIVATION 
The United States Navy invests a lot of time and resources on technological 
advancements, yet accidents continue to occur that threaten the lives of sailors and the 
mission of the Navy. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
defines a process for writing and testing system requirements and identifying risks to the 
program (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). However, the JCIDS process neither 
incorporates human fallibility into requirements or testing, nor assesses risk to the system 
resulting from human failure. The motivation for this thesis is to improve the needs analysis 
and requirements definitions for a system by informing program offices of the potential 
sources of human error. The goal of this thesis is to improve the expected system outputs 
2 
by addressing human performance issues identified from previous mishaps involving 
comparable systems and operators. Causal factors discovered during accident investigation 
are different from planned scenarios reflected in requirements definition during system 
design. For instance, operational tests do not often employ a representative user - the one 
who is fatigued and under environmental stress, who may or may not receive training on 
the system, and has to troubleshoot a system malfunction. Program offices may 
underestimate the importance of developing accurate and complete procedures at the time 
of system delivery. Program offices may not take into account that operators may be newly 
trained and inexperienced when they first operate the system, that operators may 
simultaneously be responsible for multiple systems, or that operators may be subject to 
personal stressors that affect their focus.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter I consists of the motivation and 
background of this research. Chapter II provides a discussion of early system engineering 
requirements, human reliability analysis methods, and accident investigation methods. This 
chapter also includes a description of the system of interest as well as background 
information on the Navy command that uses the system. Chapter III is a detailed 
description of the proposed process for incorporating human reliability evaluation into 
concept review for a new system. This chapter includes a discussion of the questionnaire 
used to identify system vulnerabilities to human error and a discussion of the questionnaire 
used to calculate probability of human error. A demonstration of the proposed method on 
an electronic navigation chart display is the topic of Chapter IV. This chapter also presents 
the results of the process and a discussion of the results. Chapter V consists of the 
conclusions, recommendations, and future work that continues exploration of this process. 
D. BACKGROUND 
This proposed method should be applied during the requirements development 
phase of system design (Figure 1). The desired level of system reliability is established 
during the preceding concept development phase. System performance is dependent upon 
hardware, software, and human performance. Findings from the proposed method may also 
3 
result in additional detail added to the concept of operations (CONOPS) before the 
CONOPS is finalized. Technical specifications written during the requirements 
development phase are used as input to architecture development. Once a system enters 
system development, there are fewer opportunities for changes. Changes that occur after 
product release are estimated to be 30 times more expensive than changes made during the 
requirements development stage of the product life-cycle (Lenahan 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of insertion into systems engineering process 
Acquisition programs work to reduce risk during the Technology Maturation and 
Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition (Department 
of Defense [DOD] 2015). The conceptual system design phase defines what the system 
must accomplish occurs during TMRR. Prototype designs created during TMRR are 
evaluated to reduce technical risk, validate designs, and refine requirements (DOD 2015). 
Training plans and human systems integration are not required to be finalized by the end 
of TMRR (DOD 2011). Milestone B, at the end of TMRR, is the official start of a program 
of record (AcqNotes 2018). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviews system 
requirements and system performance goals, described in the capability development 
document (CDD), in support of the Milestone B review (DOD 2015). Contracts awarded 
for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, the phase following TMRR, 
are based on CDD requirements. Changes to requirements following Milestone B may 
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result in contract revisions. Programs are motivated to identify and mitigate risk early in 
the acquisition process to over cost and schedule overruns.  
Acquisition activities during TMRR focus on reducing technical, production, and 
cost risk. During TMRR, budget analysts compare cost estimates provided by contractors 
against program estimates to look for unnecessary or unproductive costs that may result in 
future cost overages and schedule delays. To meet Milestone B exit criteria, the program 
must meet a production readiness level that indicates manufacturing processes, materials, 
and tooling are ready for production (Office of the Secretary of Defense Manufacturing 
Technology Program 2015). In the absence of physical prototypes, modeling and 
simulation is used during this phase to provide an early look at how the system may meet 
each technical specification in order to reduce technical risk. Because physical prototypes 
for operational testing do not yet exist during TMRR phase, testing with operators in 
operational environments is not conducted until after individual requirements are tested 
and system prototypes have been produced. At this late stage, it is often too late to make 
changes to technical requirements and to the design. The Canadian Space Agency found 
that insufficient testing and modeling of spacecraft and their environments contributed to 
40% of spacecraft mission failures (Majewicz et al. 2020).  
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Reliability and Maintainability 
Engineering (R&ME) Manual defines operational mission failure exclusively as hardware 
failures that prevent successful completion of mission-essential functions (Naval Sea 
Systems Command [NAVSEA] 2017). The R&ME manual mentions human factors 
engineering and human systems integration as system interfaces but does not describe any 
methods to evaluate their contributions towards the reliability requirement to demonstrate 
a mission reliability to a specified confidence level. The manual does not include any of 
the validated human reliability analysis methods that could be used to estimate the 
probability of human failure. The NAVSEA R&ME manual also recommends that failure 
mode analysis and corrective actions be included in safety programs. Failure mode analysis 
is used to examine how a system can fail. Accident investigations are similarly methodical 
in determining causes and contributors to failure, but the methods are applied after a 
catastrophic failure has already occurred. Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
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System (HFACS) is a validated method that investigates the human contribution to DOD 
mishaps (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000) but the investigative criteria are not used towards 
early design requirements for a Navy system.  
In the past, defense systems did not automatically incorporate scientists’ 
innovations and analyses into their development. Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders (1999) 
suggest that prior to World War II, the military did not recognize the importance of 
scientists’ contributions and did not invite scientists to participate in military operations. 
However, tactical military operations during World War II benefitted from the anti-
submarine warfare analysis and radar technology that the scientists developed after World 
War I. Looking for similar benefits from the field of human systems integration, the 
research question examines how human performance measures developed by human 
factors and safety professionals can be applied upfront in system development to improve 
total system performance.  
An investigation of the collisions between Navy ships and commercial vessels in 
2017, which together resulted in the deaths of 17 sailors, revealed that human performance 
factors contributed to the incidents (Davidson 2017). These factors include loss of 
situational awareness, ineffective training programs, poor fatigue management, and poor 
self-assessment. Contributing to the USS McCain (DDG-56) collision was a bridge team 
that was inexperienced with the digital throttles on the helm and lee-helm consoles. As a 
result of the investigation, design changes were made to the steering controls of Navy ships. 
If the design and testing of the original digital throttles anticipated operation by 
inexperienced and fatigue crew, it is possible that the original digital throttle design would 
not have been selected. Since the investigation confirms that crew fatigue and training 
deficiencies exist, ship design managers must take these deficiencies into account when 
forming design requirements to preserve total system performance.  
The commercial ship industry is also interested in incorporating technology to assist 
navigation on integrated ship bridges. Modern ships have hundreds of sensors and 
controllers which produce more information than a human operator can understand and act 
upon within the amount of time available. Navigators and watchstanders monitor traffic, 
geographical landmarks, and weather conditions to keep the ship on the desired route. They 
6 
receive information from a variety of sources including electronic charts, paper charts, 
automatic identification system (AIS), and lookouts. Fukuoka (2019) notes that a human’s 
ability to transmit information while also comprehending the information and making a 
decision is limited, compared with a human’s sensory capacity. The International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter V/19 requires the Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) for newly built passenger ships of at least 
500 gross tonnage, and newly built commercial ships of at least 3,000 gross tonnage. The 
ECDIS compiles geographical and depth information previously found on paper charts, 
route planning, and continuous tracking of a ship’s own position into a single display 
(International Maritime Organization [IMO] 2006). The ECDIS can also be used to display 
radar and radar-tracked target information, among other information, as additional data 
layers. Automation assists by analyzing all the sensor data and presenting clear information 
to the operator with increased reliability, compared to a human’s capacity for processing 
the potentially thousands of data points. This thesis uses ECDIS in a demonstration to 
identify the human factors that determine whether automated data presentation will 
guarantee safe navigation. Results from the demonstration will expose whether the system 
design is susceptible to human variance and also identify contributing factors to human 
error. The results from the demonstration will be used to form recommendations to improve 
human integration in the system design. The demonstration of this method will verify that 
the combination of human reliability analysis and mishap investigation methods can be 
used to evaluate the design for human roles within a system concept. The demonstration 
will also validate that the method results can be used to form specific recommendations to 
improve human integration and reduce technical risk in the system. 
7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter describes early system design activities and the need for reliable and 
recoverable systems. The literature review focuses on the importance of human integration 
with a system and introduces validated methods for human reliability analysis and accident 
investigation. The research underscores the cost impact of early error correction and justifies 
the selection of the specific human reliability and mishap investigation methods used in this 
thesis. The chapter concludes with a system description for the ECDIS, as well as a description 
of the Military Sealift Command mission and policies that dictate ECDIS’s use.  
A. SYSTEMS DESIGN 
Humans, as an integral part of a system, are often the cause of system failure. An 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations study found that 52% of root causes for mishaps 
resulting in extensive damage were due to human performance and that 33% of these 
significant mishaps were also subject to design deficiencies (Reason 1990). In addition to 
design deficiencies, Reason found that human-centered root causes, and combinations of root 
causes, included deficient procedures and documentation (43%) and training (18%). 
The International Council on Systems Engineering defines a system as an 
“arrangement of parts or elements that together exhibit behavior or meaning that the 
individual constituents do not” (International Council on Systems Engineering n.d.). System 
elements are typically comprised of hardware, software, and a human (Figure 2). Product 
design focuses on functional interactions between the hardware and software product and the 
human user (Langford 2012). Users interact directly with the system and impact the whole 
system. Internal stakeholders are entities that affect the system directly. External stakeholders 
are affected by a system. Langford (2012) offers that when people interact with systems, they 
become part of a system of systems. It is his view that interactions between a person and the 
system do not mean the person is integrated with the system. In practice, the system of systems 
includes the operators and the maintainers of the system and beyond to the organizational 
structure within which the operators and maintainers exist.  
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Figure 2. System composition 
Integration must be considered during planning phases of system design. Langford 
(2012) lists requirements definition, problem solution, and stakeholder needs as key 
determinants of integration. He asserts that integration activities must be planned upfront to 
guide scheduling and development tasks. Additionally, he states that because people are 
integrated into a system, social and political environments can negatively affect an otherwise 
satisfactory technical design. Failure to consider routes of human failure in the system design 
and operation are failures to integrate the human with the system. 
Engineered systems have a functional purpose and are created to meet an operational 
need (Blanchard and Fabricky 2011). Langford (2012, 251) states that if a problem is “ill-
defined, erroneously defined, or undefined, the solution has no meaning.” Reliability, a major 
component of system usefulness, is an operational need. System reliability is a combination 
of hardware reliability, software reliability, and human reliability (Giuntini 2000). For system 
hardware, the reliability function is a curve resembling a bathtub, with high failure rates at the 
beginning and end of their life cycle. Human performance is proposed to also have similar 
curve of reliability with three distinct phases: learning error rate phase, stabilized error rate 
phase, and fatigue error rate phase (Giuntini 2000). During the learning error rate phase, the 
probability of error decreases over time as the operator becomes more experienced with using 
the system. This reliability function is dependent on the complexity and size of the task. When 
the operator has learned the system, the likelihood of error is stabilized to a fairly constant 
value. As the operator fatigues, the error rate increases exponentially over time. Therefore, it 
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is not realistic to represent the human reliability rate as 100% for the full life cycle of the 
system. The literature review continues to search sources of variability that exist between 
operators and determine how a system can estimate human reliability given system-specific 
design attributes. 
A dynamic model of situated cognition considers how humans are influenced by both 
technology and other humans (Shattuck and Miller 2006). System designers prioritize which 
data is presented to the operator. If the data is technically inaccurate or incomplete, an operator 
may make the wrong decision or take the wrong action. Additionally, perception and 
comprehension of information can vary between operators or even vary for each event, while 
the underlying characteristics that affect how people form perceptions stay the same (Groth 
2009). System designers should be aware that these differences between operators exist and 
consider whether human variance can affect total system performance. 
Experiments for robust design help to establish system performance targets (Ulrich 
and Eppinger 2016). Ulrich and Eppinger (2016) define robust design as a product 
development activity that improves performance while minimizing the effects of uncontrolled 
variations during operation. Variations can occur in human performance or operating 
conditions. Human reliability assessments consider variable human performance factors such 
as stress, training, experience, and fatigue (Gertman et al. 2005). In the detailed design phase, 
set points for human performance and environmental factors can be incorporated into design 
requirements and operating procedures to represent less than ideal operating conditions 
(Ulrich and Eppinger 2016). During testing, system designers can study the effect of 
variations on system performance by isolating and introducing control factors (Ulrich and 
Eppinger 2016).  
System design can incorporate engineering concepts such as human-computer 
interfaces and redundant systems to protect against human error (Reason 1990). Buede and 
Miller (2016), in contrast, state that an overlap is a redundancy in functionality and that 
functional overlaps only cause problems. System designers will have to weigh the risks of 
system failure with the cost and added complexity of having a backup system. In addition to 
incorporating mitigations such as redundant functions into the product design, procedures that 
incorporate emergency operating procedures can assist operators with recovering systems 
after a hardware or software failure (Papakonstantinou et al. 2016).  
Incorporating recovery actions by operators and maintainers to diagnose early signs 
of a hardware or software failure condition can improve hardware and software reliability. 
Redundancy, for instance, can limit system failure by providing both visual and audible 
warnings to an operator to prompt action in the event of system malfunction. Written 
checklists can reinforce procedures otherwise subject to an operator’s memory. Accident 
Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP), a human reliability analysis (HRA) method, allows 
for recovery factors to decrease human error probability in optimum conditions (Swain 1987). 
The presence of multiple recovery conditions could result in a negligible human error 
probability of 0.00001.  
In addition to pressure to deliver a product that meets all technical specifications, 
defense and aerospace industries have constant pressure to complete systems on time and 
within cost. Tan, Otto, and Wood (2017) compared the cost of correcting defects during 
an operational phase with the cost of correcting errors found during development. They 
cited a National Aeronautics and Space Administration cost study that reported a 50-fold 
difference in cost of space system defects found during operations compared to the 
defects found during early concept phases. They also cite a National Institute of 
Standards and Technology cost study that reported a 10-fold cost increase to fix software 
bugs found during operation over software errors found during coding and testing. Tan, 
Otto, and Wood (2017) provide additional examples of reworked projects due to 
engineering design decisions but do not mention the 70–80% of accidents that are 
attributed to human error during aviation accidents (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000). It is 
likely that any system errors attributed to humans also have a significant cost impact. 
System designers could benefit from additional tools to identify design defects early in 
the system development process. Early identification and correction of system flaws 
would avoid costly fixes after system deployment. Cost, production, and engineering risk 
analyses are already incorporated in the early phases of the acquisition process. Risks to 
system performance due to human performance should also be included for a more 
complete risk evaluation. 
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B. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS 
Systems are comprised of human and machines. Even highly automated systems 
require human interaction to initiate system operation, to input decisions, or to maintain the 
system. Human reliability analyses can alert system designers to potential modes of human 
failure that impact the intended operation of the system. Human error probability is the 
likelihood of human error quantified by a human reliability analysis. 
Human reliability analyses build upon task analyses to provide qualitative and 
quantitative assessments of human error during human interaction with a system. Quantitative 
assessments use detailed data from system design and task procedures to return a probability 
of error. Qualitative assessments use more general information to identify areas of 
improvement relating to human error. Many human reliability quantification methods exist 
(Figure 3). The earliest method, Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP) was 
developed in 1983 for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Swain and Guttman 1983). 
Analysts match their human failure events to scenarios in THERP tables that reference stress 
and experience to determine human error probability. Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) also requires analysts to match their tasks to one of six 
generic task types before applying adjustments from 30 different error-producing conditions 
(Kirwan 1996). A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA) is among the most 
thorough of HRA methods, but it uses subject matter experts to form the nominal human error 
probabilities when other HRA methods cannot be applied (Boring and Gertman 2016).  
 
Figure 3. Timeline of selected HRA methods 
Some HRA methods, such as Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Model (CREAM), 
can be used for both human error prediction and accident investigation. This method 
categorizes failures by their error modes and causes of action (Hollnagel 1998). The method 
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must be applied twice, once for basic analysis and once for complex analysis, to map errors 
to control modes that are either strategic, tactical, opportunistic, or scrambled. The range of 
human error probabilities depends on the control mode. CREAM has been applied to studying 
causal factors for marine accidents resulting from human failures of a ship’s bridge, such as 
the Officer of the Watch (Yoshimura, Takemoto, and Mitomo 2015). Wu et al. (2017) also 
studied CREAM as an accident investigative method but focused on determining uncertainty 
within the method’s common performance conditions.  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed the Standardized Plant Analysis 
Risk-Human (SPAR-H) in the mid-1990s as a simplified approach for HRA. The SPAR-H 
analyst evaluates eight performance shaping factors (PSFs) for each human action and 
decision required by the system of interest: available time, procedures, ergonomics/human-
machine interface (HMI), training and experience, complexity, stress, fitness for duty, and 
work processes. Three of the eight PSFs, complexity, ergonomics/human-machine interface, 
and procedures, align with system technical specifications. Operational tempo and product 
design influence the PSF of available time because system design can affect how operators 
make decisions. The other PSFs address organizational factors and factors specific to an 
individual’s experience, training and stress level. Multiple studies use SPAR-H PSFs to 
evaluate specific aspects of system design including industrial maintenance (Franciosi 2019) 
and design of corrective actions (L’Her, Van Bossuyt, and O’Halloran 2017). 
Researchers have created hybrid HRA methods to capitalize on the strengths of each 
model while compensating for the weaknesses of the other model. De Felice, Petrillo, and 
Zomparelli (2016) combined CREAM and System Human Error Reduction and Prediction 
Approach (SHERPA) into a single hybrid model that keeps the basic framework from 
CREAM and uses SHERPA’s methods to consider the variety of operator actions. Rangra et 
al. (2017) created a new method specifically for the railway industry that evaluates the 
conditional relationship between human, technical, and organizational factors. 
The desired HRA method for this thesis process should be able to be applied 
predictively ahead of any accident; repeatedly to allow for evaluation of alternative designs 
and conditions; and easily by analysts with limited HRA experience. Results from the analysis 
should provide enough detail to help the designers understand which factors most greatly 
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drive human error probability despite limited system information available during the early 
stages of system development. Both THERP and HEART methods require analysts to 
understand the HRA methods well enough to apply the nuclear-industry-originated task tables 
to the generic non-nuclear system under evaluation (Boring and Blackman 2016). Further, the 
limited number of THERP PSFs do not provide sufficient feedback to the system design team. 
A simplified version of THERP and geared toward for teams without HRA expertise, ASEP 
is criticized for being over-simplified by trading details for conservative results (Boring and 
Gertman 2016). Boring and Blackman judge results from CREAM to be excessively uniform 
due to the use of three human failure events despite the number of decisions input into the 
method and therefore, CREAM is rejected as a candidate method for this thesis in favor of a 
method that better illustrates contributions from each performance factor. De Felice, Petrillo, 
and Zomparelli (2016) found a limitation of SHERPA to be application to complex decision-
making tasks; therefore, this method is rejected in favor of a method that considers both 
operator actions and decisions. An in-house analysis method is preferred; therefore 
ATHEANA is not considered to be a suitable candidate method due to its reliance on multiple 
HRA experts to form a consensus opinion. The selected HRA method, SPAR-H, is a blend of 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis that considers eight performance shaping factors. It 
allows for one-pass, repeatable evaluation of tasks by a team of non-experts. The SPAR-H 
method allows analysts to quickly modify inputs in response to system design or operating 
condition changes. This will allow the analysts to observe any resulting changes to the human 
error probabilities for decisions and actions. 
SPAR-H calculates human error probability (HEP) by multiplying eight factors by a 
nominal human error probability (NHEP). Nominal HEP is widely accepted as one per one 
thousand occurrences (Gertman et al. 2005). However, there are multiple factors that 
influence whether humans fail or succeed. SPAR-H considers each of these factors one at a 
time using performance shaping factors. Each of eight PSFs is evaluated to determine a 
multiplication factor to the nominal human error probability for action, 1E-3 or the nominal 
human error probability for diagnosis, 1E-2. The eight SPAR-H PSFs are available time, 
stress and stressors, experience and training, complexity, ergonomics (including the human-
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machine interface), procedures, fitness for duty, and work processes. Larger multipliers result 
in a greater likelihood of event occurrence. 
• Available time assesses the amount of time an operator has to diagnose, 
decide, and execute an appropriate action. The time spent to diagnose and 
decide reduces time available to take action and vice versa. SPAR-H 
multipliers for available time range from 0.01 to 10 (Gertman et al. 2005). If 
there is inadequate time to diagnose, decide, or act, the human error 
probability is 1.0. If there is additional time to recover from errors, a 
multiplier less than 1 is allowed. 
• High and extreme levels of stress can have a negative impact on human 
performance. Stress includes mental stress such as apprehension or 
nervousness, excessive workload, and physical stress due to excessive heat, 
noise, or ventilation. SPAR-H multipliers for stress range from 1 to 5 
(Gertman et al. 2005). 
• Complexity considers the difficulty of a task. Complex tasks require a 
greater skill to successfully complete. Difficult tasks have a larger chance of 
human error. Difficulty can be associated with great mental effort such as 
memory or mental calculations or physical efforts that require a complicated 
pattern of movement. SPAR-H multipliers for complexity range from 1 to 5 
(Gertman et al. 2005). 
• The experience and training PSF considers the years of experience of the 
individual or crew and whether the operator or crew has been trained on 
recovery from equipment failure. SPAR-H multipliers for this PSF range 
between 0.5 and 10 (Gertman et al. 2005).   
• Formal operating procedures may be ambiguous, wrong, inadequate, or 
nonexistent. Material evaluated in support of this PSF include technical 
manuals, procedures, emergency operating procedures, and standing orders. 
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SPAR-H multipliers for procedures range from 1 to 50 (Gertman et al. 
2005). 
• The ergonomics PSF evaluates the displays and controls as well as the 
equipment and interface layout. When system controls and displays are not 
co-located in one designated place, it is difficult for an operator to 
simultaneously monitor and respond to all indicators. In some cases, required 
indicators are missing or misleading. Operators that ignore equipment that is 
consistently unreliable, even if the equipment is working correctly, cause the 
overall system to negatively perform. SPAR-H multipliers for ergonomics 
range from 0.5 to 50 (Gertman et al. 2005). 
• Fitness for duty considers whether or not the individual is physically or 
mentally able to perform the current task. Fatigue, sickness, legal or illegal 
drug use, and overconfidence are unrelated to training and experience but all 
negatively affect operator performance. If the operator is unable to perform 
due to these conditions or has a negative cognitive status, the human error 
probability for the event is 1.0. Otherwise, SPAR-H multipliers for fitness 
for duty are scored 1 or 5 (Gertman et al. 2005).  
• Work processes include organizational culture, communication, and 
management and supervisory policies that may affect performance. 
Individuals may not understand work requirements if planning and 
communication are poor. Conflicts between groups such as between 
engineering and operations or between operators and management, 
indecisiveness, an uncoordinated approach to safety, or lack of adherence to 
enforcement actions and notices are examples of work process problems. 
SPAR-H multipliers for work processes range from 0.8 to 5 (Gertman et al. 
2005). 
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C. MISHAP INVESTIGATION METHODS 
Mishaps are unplanned events that occur as a result of human actions and decisions 
(Reason 1990). Mishaps have negative impacts on cost, schedule, safety, and mission 
completion. Mishaps can also result in loss of confidence in a system or organization. 
There are three types of Navy mishap investigations (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations [OCNO] 2011). Safety investigations are conducted for the purpose of preventing 
future mishaps. Judge advocate general manual investigations are administrative 
investigations. Criminal and security investigations are conducted by Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service. The Navy and Marine Corps Mishap and Safety Investigation, 
Reporting, and Recordkeeping Manual specifies the information that is collected during a 
safety investigation and reported by the safety investigation board (OCNO 2005). Safety 
investigation boards are comprised by three to five members that include subject matter 
experts on the system, equipment, or procedures. 
The safety investigation board leader documents the following information regarding 
the mishap in the safety investigation report: environmental state, human factors, and material 
condition (OCNO 2005). Details of the mishap environment include wind, sea state, 
temperature, visibility, noise, and presence of lightning. Unsafe acts, supervisory violations, 
preconditions, and procedures are captured in the human factors section of the report. The 
investigators also inquire about the operator’s training and experience level, level of fatigue 
at the time of the accident, and any evidence of drug use. Material conditions, such as wear 
and tear, defects, safety guard failures, and unauthorized alterations, are documented by 
investigators. 
Both accident investigation methods and human reliability methods recognize 
contributions to mishaps beyond a single operator action. Leveson (2004) developed Systems-
Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP) which focuses on system safety controls 
as leading cause of accidents, rather than component failures. Basnyat et al. (2006) propose 
using mishap investigation to improve safety systems. The Software, Hardware, Environment, 
Liveware-Liveware (SHELL) (International Civil Aviation Organization 2012) model 
evaluates the interactions between physical systems, computer software, operating 
17 
procedures, pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance personnel, and their environment, as 
contributors to an accident. Labor inspectors use Method of Investigation for Labor Inspectors 
(MILI) (Katsakiori et al. 2010) to evaluate the impact of workplace and organization factors 
on accident causation. DOD HFACS uses nanocodes in the domains of unsafe acts, 
preconditions, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences to track contributing causes 
of aviation mishaps (Shappell and Wiegmann 2001). The DOD HFACS classification 
categories are the same four categories as those in Reason’s model of error causation (Reason 
1990).  
Multiple studies have adapted HFACS by rephrasing and adding nanocodes to be 
applicable to a specific industry and analysts who are more familiar with their own industry 
than with human reliability analysis. Modified HFACS methods have been developed, 
including HFACS-Maintenance Error (Schmidt, Schmorrow, and Figlock 2000), HFACS-
Maritime (Xi et al. 2017), HFACS-Maritime Accidents (Chen and Chou 2012), and HFACS-
Bayesian Network (Zhou, Zhang, and Baasansuren 2018). Modification of HFACS has been 
shown to increase inter-rater agreement over use of the original HFACS nanocodes (Schmidt, 
Schmorrow, and Figlock 2000; Bilbro 2013).  
Studies have used HFACS to discern significance between contributing factors to 
human error. For instance, Taranto (2013) used HFACS to determine that ground control 
station design had more of an impact on human error than aircraft design. The study also 
found that organizational climate was the only diagnostic category that was statistically 
significant. The Preconditions category was rated by Chen and Chou (2012) to be the most 
vulnerable part of the system because hardware defects influence human actions and 
decisions. 
Of the accident investigation methods surveyed, SHELL and HFACS are favored 
because STAMP and MILI each have a narrower focus; STAMP considers primarily safety 
controls and MILI primarily considers broad workplace factors. The SHELL method is 
rejected for this thesis because the tool is more conceptual than HFACS. The organization of 
HFACS is preferred because the description of subcategories and nanocodes both assist the 
analysts with applying the investigative criteria and also with understanding the results which 
map back to the subcategories and nanocodes. 
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The first category in DOD HFACS 7.0 is Unsafe Acts. Unsafe acts are the operator 
actions that directly lead to a mishap. Operator actions considered in this category are 
deliberate violations of rules and unintentional errors due to performance or mental lapse. 
There are 13 Unsafe Acts nanocodes in three subcategories. Accidental movements by an 
operator that turn equipment on or off and movements that are performed too quickly or 
slowly are examples of skill-based errors. Examples of judgement-based errors are failures to 
acknowledge a warning, failures to correctly prioritize tasks, and application of incorrect logic 
to choose an action. Performing workarounds to published procedures are willful violations. 
Individuals, crews, and teams can commit violations. 
The second DOD HFACS 7.0 category is Preconditions. Preconditions include factors 
attributed to the operator, environment, or equipment that influence an operator’s action or 
judgement to cause a failure. The majority of HFACS codes are preconditions. There are 61 
total nanocodes in seven subcategories. Physical elements such as weather, whiteout, or dust 
storms impair vision. Extraneous noises and extreme temperatures distract operators from 
accomplishing tasks. Individuals may have cognitive, behavioral, or physical and mental 
limitations that can cause an unsafe condition. Mental awareness factors, including 
inattentiveness, fixation, confusion, overload, and boredom, affect operator perception and 
performance. An operator’s state of mind is important to successful task completion. Life 
stresses, overconfidence, complacency, motivation, and burnout all affect state of mind. 
Physical problems affecting human performance include effects of drugs or alcohol, fatigue 
or dizziness, hyperventilation, light adaptation, strength, dexterity, and coordination. Sensory 
inputs that misrepresent balance, movement, space, time, or visual and auditory cues can lead 
to unsafe situations. The HFACS Preconditions category also considers team interactions. 
Individual failures in leadership, task delegation, assertiveness, and effective communications 
also contribute to human error. Step 5 uses six of the precondition subcategories. The 
Technological Environment subcategories propose human failures that result from system 
design. Technical preconditions include design of seating, instrumentation, warnings, 
controls, switches, automation, workspace, personal equipment, and communication 
equipment. This subcategory is reserved for use in Step 6. 
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The next category is Unsafe Supervision. The supervisory chain of command 
influences how operators perform. The Unsafe Supervision category considers supervision, 
operations planning, and supervisor violations that lead to operator error. There are three 
subcategories decomposed into 17 total Unsafe Supervision individual factors. Supervisors 
provide guidance, training, and oversight. Failure to provide good role-modeling and critical 
feedback, failure to selected proficient individuals, and failure to respond to critical 
information do not help the operator to succeed. Supervisors must adequately assess risk 
before their teams perform the work. They must enforce existing rules and never direct 
individuals to violate rules and procedures. 
The last DOD HFACS category is Organizational Influences. Commanding officers 
establish the tempo and priorities for their organizations. The Organizational Influences 
category considers how senior leaders address overall operations, procedures, and oversight. 
Four Organizational Influences subcategories are decomposed into 18 total nanocodes. Senior 
leaders control resource levels and staffing selection, including the establishment of 
infrastructure, intelligence, command and control, and funding in the overall system 
environment. 
D. ELECTRONIC CHART DISPLAY AND INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Accident investigations following ship collisions and groundings find that human 
error is a cause of 80–85% of maritime accidents (Baker and Seah 2004). Baker and Seah 
(2004) report that 72% of the human factor errors were due to situation assessment and 
awareness. Filipkowski (2013, 256) reports that the most common cause of groundings are 
“bad management and lack of cooperation on the bridge” (18%) and “lack of or improperly 
preparing voyage planning” (17%). Modern seafarers also face an increasing operational pace 
and longer working hours, resulting in insufficient rest hours (Yilmaz, Basar and Yüksekyildiz 
2018). These findings indicate that although an installed system provides compiled 
navigational and voyage information, human error using the system can still result in accidents 
at sea. 
The system selected for demonstration, ECDIS, is used by the Navy and by 
commercial ships worldwide. The ECDIS is an electronic navigation system that integrates 
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data such as ship’s course and speed, the ship’s depth and radar data, and electronic navigation 
charts (IMO 2006). Manufacturers of the ECDIS include Furuno, Marine Technologies, 
Navico, Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine, and Raytheon (United States Coast Guard 
[USCG] 2020). Ships may use any United States Coast Guard (USCG)-certified ECDIS 
system. According to the Military Sealift Command Force Navigator, a ship’s navigation 
officer uses ECDIS for voyage planning, route monitoring, and monitoring traffic on AIS 
(email to the author, July 17, 2020). Prior to electronic charting, mariners used paper charts 
to track the ship’s position against water depth, navigational hazards and navigational aids. A 
separate National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration database supplies information 
electronically on tides and currents (Lawrence Fahey, personal communication, June 14, 
2020). Future iterations of ECDIS will allow for integration of tidal information within ECDIS 
(Alexander Halliday, personal communication, July 1, 2020). The system has 40 layers of 
geographic information that users can choose to individually show or hide on the computer 
screen (IMO 2004). Visual and audible alerts warn the operator when the ship crosses preset 
navigational boundaries or enters dangerous conditions (IMO 2006). However, it is the ship’s 
radar system and not ECDIS which issues alerts when the ship is in close proximity to other 
ship traffic (Lawrence Fahey, personal communication, July 1, 2020).  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 
requirement, MSC.232(86), mandates that all ships ranging from 500 gross ton passenger 
ships to cargo ships in excess of 10,000 gross tons use ECDIS. Implementation began in 2010 
with newly constructed ships and ended in 2018 on existing ships (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. ECDIS implementation schedule on commercial ships. 
Source: Kos, Brcic, and Pusic (2013). 
The global positioning system (GPS) was first developed in 1963 for position, 
navigation, and timing (PNT) and became fully operational in 1995 (Grenier 2019). 
Celestial navigation, once relied upon by sea voyagers, is no longer taught at the U.S. Naval 
Academy (Grenier 2019). In 2006, the IMO MSC introduced Resolution MSC.232(82) 
which revised the performance standards for ECDIS. The revised performance standards 
address the capability to update electronic charts, preservation of the data integrity of 
electronic navigation charts, operational and functional ECDIS requirements, and 
requirements for integration and interfaces with other ship equipment. Ships are still 
required to keep paper logs and paper charts as a means of redundancy. The Guidance for 
Good Practice, published by IMO in 2017, consolidates guidance from seven IMO 
circulars into one consolidated document to assist navigators with ECDIS implementation 
and safe operation. The seven topics within MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev.1 (2017a) are SOLAS 
chart carriage requirements, maintenance of ECDIS software, known ECDIS operating 
anomalies, differences between raster chart display system and ECDIS, ECDIS training, 
transitioning from paper charts to ECDIS navigation, and guidance on training on ECDIS 
simulators. 
The installation of ECDIS on ships does not mean a ship will be free of all 
navigation failures. Ships equipped with ECDIS still have grounding accidents. The United 
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Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch found instances in their investigations 
where ship’s officers had not been trained to use ECDIS, the navigation officer and other 
bridge personnel did not have sufficient ECDIS experience, and a voyage plan that was 
prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised junior officer was reviewed neither by the 
captain before departure nor the navigation officer at the beginning of the watch (Fukuoka 
2019). Bye and Aalberg (2018) studied 931 maritime accidents that occurred in Norwegian 
waters between 2010 and 2016. They found that navigation accidents comprised 69.2% of 
cargo vessels accidents, 44.3% of passenger vessel accidents, and 66.5% of fishing vessel 
accidents. Generally speaking, not all collisions and groundings are due to navigational 
error. Some accidents result from improper steering. Bye and Aalberg also found that 
variables that increase risk of navigation accident are unrelated to ECDIS operation: type 
of vessel, low visibility, darkness, vessel length, vessel age, gross tonnage, days of 
operation, speed in last hour, number of course alteration, number of recent port calls, and 
the number of vessels in the immediate area. Bauk and Radlinger (2013) suggest that 
electronic navigation systems mitigate navigator fatigue and stress, which results in fewer 
maritime accidents. Others such as Fahey and Muthig (Lawrence Fahey and William 
Muthig, interview, July 8, 2020), theorize that ECDIS is a safety improvement because it 
provides warnings based on a continuous PNT data and adds operational capability by 
providing the navigator with accurate, real-time information. Schweighardt (2001) found 
in his thesis that eight of the Navy’s 17 collisions and groundings from 1998–2001 could 
have been prevented by using Electronic Chart Display and Information System-Navy 
(ECDIS-N). He also calculated that installation of ECDIS across the fleet would have saved 
96% of the repair cost for the accidents.  
1. Military Sealift Command  
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) supports the Navy and DOD by providing 
logistics support, transporting military equipment, cargo, and supplies combat forces 
worldwide, as well as humanitarian relief (Military Sealift Command [MSC] n.d.a). For 
the purpose of this thesis, the acronym MSC is used to refer to the Military Sealift 
Command, while the International Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee will 
be referred to as IMO MSC. All government-owned, government-operated MSC ships have 
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ECDIS installed in accordance with SOLAS V/19. U.S. Fleet Forces Command directs 
MSC Navy-unique matters, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition directs MSC procurement policy and provides oversight 
(MSC n.d.a). However, according to Dr. Alexander Halliday, the MSC Force Navigator, 
MSC is exempt from some Navy requirements, specifically those pertaining to combatant 
ships (Alexander Halliday, personal communication, July 1, 2020). In further discussion 
with Dr. Halliday and Mr. William Muthig, MSC Training Division Chief, MSC meets 
both Navy requirements and the IMO certificate of voluntary compliance. In contrast to 
Navy ships, the MSC workforce is comprised of 80% federal civil service mariners 
(CIVMARs) (MSC n.d.a). It follows that the MSC follows civilian commercial ship 
standards, including those for manning levels and personnel organization.  
The commanding officer of an MSC ship is the master and his executive officer is 
the chief mate (MSC n.d.b). Both are required to be licensed (USCG 2018). The second 
officer is the navigation officer (MSC n.d.b). It is the sole responsibility of the second 
officer to prepare a navigation plan (MSC n.d.b). According to Dr. Halliday, in discussion 
with the author on July 8, 2020, the navigation officer prepares the voyage plan and the 
master reviews and signs the voyage plan. Both the second and third officers serve as watch 
officers (MSC n.d.b). Dr. Halliday states that a typical watch team consists of a watch 
officer, helmsman, and lookout. The watch officer is responsible for monitoring the voyage 
(MSC n.d.b). 
2. U.S. Navy  
The Navy’s electronic charting system, ECDIS-N, has Navy-specific requirements 
in addition to those in Maritime Safety Committee revised performance standards for 
ECDIS. Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems 6.0 controls the software 
requirements document for ECDIS-N (Scott Downs, personal communication, May 14, 
2020). Northrop Grumman’s Sperry Marine Interfaces developed the ECDIS-N to work 
with a ship’s navigation system and sensors including PNT distribution systems, GPS 
receivers, gyrocompass, speed sensors, and fathometers, and radio detection and ranging 
(Fein 2005). The Navy certified ECDIS-N for use on all surface ships and Los Angeles-
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class submarines in 2005, with full-fleet implementation in 2009 (Fein 2005). Fein 
continues that electronic charts on 29 compact discs replace approximately 5,000 paper 
charts. According to Lawrence Fahey in a discussion on July 1, 2020, ships install chart 
updates received via compact disc or data link.  
Differences exist between ECDIS-N and ECDIS. The Navy’s ECDIS-N includes 
software requirements that do not apply to ECDIS and receives chart information from the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) instead of the Government Hydrographic 
Office (Lawrence Fahey, personal communication, May 14, 2020). The Navy’s ECDIS-N 
uses the NIMA database format and automatic updating instead of the International 
Hydrographic Organization database format and updates, and also uses Navy-specific 
position systems and sources (OCNO 2001). Differences also exist between the 
navigational requirements that the Navy follows and the requirements followed by 
commercial ships. The general requirements for safe navigation apply to military vessels. 
However, Navy military ships are exempt from following certain aspects of SOLAS 
convention such as those pertaining to carrying a second power supply for the navigation 
system as claimed by Dr. Halliday in a July 1, 2020, interview with the author. Also, the 
Navy is generally not required to comply with IMO resolutions but follows DOD mandates 
to use international standards wherever possible. (OCNO 2001).  
The thesis process proposed in Chapter III considers a motivation during TMRR is 
to reduce risk despite the lack of detailed system specifications following the concept 
development phase. The literature review surveyed a number of human reliability methods 
and accident investigation methods to select candidate methods that could be used by a 
team of analysts with little knowledge and experience of human reliability and accident 
investigation. The SPAR-H human reliability method and the DOD HFACS accident 
investigation method both have potential to accept the available concept information as 
input and then return potential areas of risk of system failure as results of the analysis. The 
selected system of interest for the demonstration has relevance to the Navy, but because of 
the classification requirements for ECDIS-N, this thesis will focus on the usage of ECDIS 
within the MSC, which follows commercial requirements for ECDIS. 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Both human reliability analysis and mishap analysis involve systems-of-systems 
thinking to understand the individual, environment, and organizational factors that 
contribute to human errors in action and decision-making. Human reliability analysis 
considers the likelihood of events that have not yet occurred. Mishap investigations 
uncover contributing factors to an accident that has already occurred. Using these methods 
in combination reveals whether the system design is resilient to human failure or whether 
the design itself causes a human to make the wrong decision or take the wrong action. This 
chapter describes a method to combine the attributes of human reliability analysis and 
mishap investigation into a process that begins with the concept of a new system. 
A. OVERALL DESIGN EFFORT 
Humans, as part of the system, are important for system success. System success is 
the accomplishment of the intended system function. Within the system boundaries, 
humans interact with system hardware and software to control and monitor functions, to 
recover from system malfunctions, and to maintain and support the system architecture 
among other activites. Given that humans are able to adapt to the capabilities and 
limitations of technology, the role of humans within systems is even more powerful 
(Norman 2005, 16). Norman proposes that system failures could be the result of a 
misunderstanding of humans and activities, and that a greater understanding of the activity 
could benefit total system performance. The proposed method in this thesis is intended to 
be used during the requirements development phase following the definition of desired 
system activities during the concept development phase. At this stage of development 
results from the proposed method can be used to improve the definition of human activities 
within the system if warranted. 
Systems rely on humans to diagnose, decide and act. The operator recognizes the 
system state and the operational environment, decides on an appropriate action, and 
executes the action. Boyd described this cycle as an observe-orient-decide-act loop 
(Angerman 2004). In this loop, the human takes in sensory input and considers the new 
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input in the context of the present environment and previously obtained knowledge before 
forming a decision and taking action. The operator’s role ranges from controlling the 
machine to making complex decisions on actions in atypical or emergency situations 
(Havlikova and Sediva 2012). Successful accomplishment of human activities is dependent 
upon an operator’s personal factors including training, experience, and present physical 
condition, among other factors. The SPAR-H methodology applies these performance 
factors to calculations of both decision-based and action-based errors. 
Hermann (2014) offers that the system boundary between the technical 
infrastructure, of which the human is a part, and organizational processes is blurred. He 
advocates for a socio-technical system design to improve system success. Beyond the 
system boundaries, humans affect a system through supervisory practices, organizational 
policies, and operational pace (Figure 5). Both SPAR-H and HFACS evaluate supervisory 
and organizational influences on system performance. 
 
Figure 5. External interfaces to system 
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System hardware and software operate within defined tolerances. There is a similar 
range of individual human performance and organizational processes that affect system 
performance. The questionnaires developed for the proposed process present performance 
factors that may affect how successfully an operator contributes to system performance. 
The proposed method will evaluate how well the design is anticipated to perform given a 
range of individual, supervisory, and organizational conditions. 
Sequential steps in the proposed process help an assessment team to scope the 
analysis to the system functions that require human action and decision then identify the 
combination of human, hardware, and software events that are needed to complete the 
function. As the process continues, the analysis will reveal which functions are the most 
vulnerable to a variable human performance, and the likelihood that the human will make 
an error while performing a system function. The results in total can be used to form 
specific recommendations that address human interactions with the system that increase 
technical risk.  
B. CONCEPT REVIEW USING SPAR-H/HFACS PROCESS  
As an approach to review the system concept for the purpose of providing inputs 
and feedback to system requirements, this thesis creates the Concept Review Using SPAR-
H/HFACS (CRUSH) process (Figure 6). The overall CRUSH process is based on IEEE-
1082-2017 (2017) which describes how HRA can be included in a probabilistic risk 
assessment. A brief description of each step of CRUSH follows with detailed information 
in subsequent subsections. 
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Figure 6. CRUSH process steps 
In Step 1 of CRUSH, the program identifies a human reliability requirements team 
to perform the evaluation. Requirements are developed by a multi-disciplinary team that is 
invested in the operations and maintenance of the system. This team develops requirements 
that include system functionality, the user population, the system environment, and concept 
of operations. The requirements development team resourced by the program is typically 
comprised of a diverse group of engineers, operators, managers, and logisticians. A subset 
of the program requirements team will be used for the human reliability requirements team 
to focus specifically on human interactions with the physical system. The addition of at 
least one human factors specialist gives the human reliability requirements team a 
perspective on how humans make decisions and perform given various inputs and under 
varying environments. Once formed, each member of the human reliability requirements 
team becomes familiar with basic human reliability concepts such as human failure events, 
causes and types of human error, and nominal human error potential.  
In Step 2, the human reliability requirements team studies the goals of the proposed 
system operation. This is a top-down approach as the team looks from the overall system 
capability to individual system functions. During this second step, the team defines the 
system boundaries, which subsystems are critical, essential, or non-essential, and threshold 
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levels for success in the case of degraded operations. The team notes system functions that 
require human interactions including processes to initiate, operate, maintain, and retire the 
system. The team should also note any policies and constraints that affect system operation. 
At the end of Step 2, the human reliability requirements team reaches a consensus on the 
threshold of acceptable system performance. This guides the sensitivity of the analysis. 
Human failure events can result in various levels of system performance ranging from 
normal operation to system degradation or system loss.  
Step 3 has the human reliability requirements team note the system functions that 
require human interactions and initial estimates of time available for each human 
interaction for decision-making and to take successful action. Sources of information 
include the draft CONOPS, draft CDD, and preliminary acquisition strategy. For each 
system function with a human interaction, the team can decompose system functions into 
human functions using a functional analysis. This analysis is a functional analysis and not 
a task analysis because the system is still being conceptualized. Even with highly 
automated systems, humans receive input from indicators and alarms. Humans may also 
initiate or execute actions for operation or recovery. An action diagram (Figure 7) is one 
type of model that depicts functions in a chronological order. Each block in the action 
diagram represents a human interaction with the system needed to complete the system 
function. Recovery actions to restore functions can also be included in an action diagram. 
The functions represented in the action diagram will be referred to as “work blocks” for 
the purpose of this thesis. The work blocks in the action diagram are presented in 
chronological order to show the order functions are access to complete a task from start to 
finish. In reality, the tasks depicted by each work block are used multiple times as needed 
by the operating personnel. 
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Figure 7. Sample action diagram for bridge navigation operations 
In Step 4, each human function in an action diagram can be further decomposed 
into combinations of basic events comprised of hardware, software and human events. 
These may be depicted in fault trees to show various ways that the combinations of events 
are needed to succeed or fail. The fault tree is a logic diagram that depicts the combination 
of basic events that could cause the top event failure to occur. The top event of each fault 
tree is a failure of each work block in each action diagram. For instance, a fault tree 
depicting “Failure to recognize that an alarm or indicator requires attention” shows failure 
pathways encompassing shortcomings of the system design and personal factors that affect 
whether an individual’s attention is drawn to the indicator or alarm (Figure 8). Human 
events can be combined with hardware and software failure. Among other design reasons, 
the machine components responsible for the visual or audible presentation may not be 
adequate given the operational environment. The sample fault tree shows that, in addition 
to an operator’s personal factors, if the alarm was previously disabled or an operator is 
attending another piece of equipment in a different area, then the alarm can go unnoticed. 
For other top events, if successful completion of a prerequisite step is required, the fault 
tree logic includes a basic event for the completion of the prerequisite step. 
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Figure 8. Sample fault tree for failure to sense the alarm/indicator 
Recovery events by humans are also subject to human failure. Analysts may include 
planned recovery events by humans in the functional analysis, action diagram, or in the 
fault tree in combination with a hardware or software error. Recovery events are treated 
the same as other human failure events in CRUSH. The likelihood of human error for a 
recovery event indicates the probability that the recovery event is not successful. 
In Step 5, the team completes a questionnaire that is based on the HFACS categories 
of unsafe acts, preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences. The purpose of 
this step is to determine the impact on system performance if specific conditions exist. The 
result of this evaluation is a list of HFACS subcategories that would each render a system 
nonoperational. Section C details the development and rationale of this questionnaire. 
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In Step 6, the team focus is on evaluation of the impact of the system design on 
human reliability. The purpose of this step is to determine the probability that a human 
commits an error for a particular event and the factors that increase this likelihood. This is 
a bottom-up approach as the team looks to reverse-engineer the system design to remove 
sources of error. SPAR-H performance shaping factors and PSF multipliers are used to 
calculate human error potential. This thesis proposes a questionnaire in Step 6 that uses 
HFACS nanocodes to select the level of each PSF. PSF evaluation focuses on attributes 
that result in a PSF level greater than 1. Certain conditions cause a 50-fold increase in error 
probability while other conditions do not increase the standard human error potential. The 
result of this step is a calculated probability of human error and a specific reason for 
selection of each PSF multiplier. Section C details the development and rationale for this 
questionnaire. 
In Step 7, the results from Steps 5 and 6 are reviewed to confirm that the results are 
correct and realistic. The program may not have anticipated all the human roles that 
influence whether the system function can be completed. It may also be unexpected to have 
a number of work blocks where the calculated HEP is 1.0. The team can review the 
individual PSF multipliers for any HEPs that did not meet expectations and re-evaluate the 
HEPs to provide extra fidelity in the assessment of the individual PSFs.  
In the final step, Step 8, the team presents the results of the CRUSH process to 
program leaders. Decision makers can consider whether the calculated human error 
probability is acceptable for total system performance. The analysis also can identify 
relative probabilities between two actions if alternate designs are presented. Program 
leaders may use the results to add functional requirements, technical specifications, or 
advocate for changes to training, staffing, or policy guidelines. Leaders may also choose 
to accept the identified risks without any changes to program efforts. Because this new 
method is a model, different inputs can be proposed to determine impact to the overall 
probability of occurrence. Decision makers can examine the inputs to the analysis to 
determine which actions and designs have major contributors to the probability. 
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C. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF CRUSH STEPS 5 AND 6 
Steps 5 and 6 of CRUSH use a combination of HFACS and SPAR-H attributes to 
evaluate the proposed system concept. This section discusses each question posed by the 
Step 5 and Step 6 questionnaire, and how each question is related to the HFACS and SPAR-
H assessment criteria. 
1. CRUSH Step 5 
In Step 5, the impact of external influences on system performance is explored 
further. This step is repeated for each work block identified in Step 4. Physical environment 
and organization culture as well as individual attributes like training, experience, 
motivation, and physiological problems are put forward individually as challenges to the 
system to determine if the work block can still be accomplished.  
Step 5 uses predominantly HFACS subcategories as the basis for the questionnaire. 
Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) organized HFACS into four categories that match the four 
tiers of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model: Unsafe Acts, Preconditions to Unsafe Acts, Unsafe 
Supervision, and Organizational Influences. Each category is further divided into 
subcategories and nanocodes, which are individual factors within the subcategories. 
Shappell and Wiegmann’s (2000) original HFACS has 147 total nanocodes. King et al. 
(2015) reduced the number of nanocodes in DOD HFACS 7.0 to 109 nanocodes for the 
purpose of improving inter-rater agreement (King et al. 2015). This thesis uses the 
subcategories in DOD HFACS 7.0. 
The questionnaire references the HFACS subcategories instead of the more detailed 
HFACS nanocodes because inter-rater agreement is greater at the category level compared 
to the nanocodes level (O’Connor 2008; Griggs 2012). Agreement at the category level 
ranged from 53% to 99% (Ergai 2013). Agreement at the nanocode level ranged from 24% 
to 43% (Ergai 2013). Studies propose that poor agreement is due to over-specificity of 
nanocodes descriptions, amount of HFACS training, and human factors experience of the 
raters (O’Connor 2008). Restricting the use of HFACS in this thesis to 17 subcategories 
instead of using all 109 nanocodes reduces the complexity of the method and improves the 
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reliability of the method itself. Figure 9 introduces the categories, subcategories, and 
nanocodes used in the CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire. 
 
Figure 9. CRUSH Step 5 focus areas based on HFACS 
The Step 5 questionnaire consists of four binary questions with additional 
descriptive statements for each question (Figure 10). The evaluator should add a specific 
example of failure for each sub-statement as applies. The Step 5 questionnaire is provided 
in the Appendix. 
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Figure 10. Individual questions in the CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire 
Question 1 focuses on unsafe acts and asks whether a judgement error, action error, 
or violation would cause the work block to be uncompleted. There are three statements in 
this section that correspond to HFACS nanocodes for the subcategories: performance-
based errors (AE100), judgment and decision-making errors (AE200), and violations 
(AV000). Question 1 is anchored by the phrase “Can the work block be completed” to 
remind the evaluator that only the statements that result in a work block failure are counted. 
This does not imply that the entire system will fail if each condition is satisfied. The 
conditions supporting question 1 are: 
• Wrong decision or no decision 
• Wrong action or no action 
• Violation of known procedure. 
Agreement with at least one of the three conditions results in a Yes for Question 1. 
The team notes any specific actions, decisions, or violations to document the assumptions 
used in the evaluation. The result from this evaluation shows the work blocks that withstand 
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the worst-case scenarios for each of the 17 HFACS subcategories; and the HFACS 
subcategory that prevent other work blocks from being completed. 
Question 2 focuses on preconditions and asks whether non-technical preconditions 
would cause the work block to fail. There are six statements in this section that correspond 
to HFACS nanocodes for precondition subcategories: physical environment (PE100), 
physical problem (PC300), state of mind (PC200), sensory misperception (PC500), mental 
awareness (PC100), and teamwork (PP100). Question 2 is anchored by the phrase “Can 
the work block be completed” to remind the evaluator that only the statements that result 
in a work block failure are counted. This does not imply that the entire system will fail if 
each condition is satisfied. The statements supporting question 2 are: 
• Physical environment negatively affects operator action or decision 
• Individual’s medical or physiological condition 
• Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological 
disorders, or inappropriate motivation 
• Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) create a 
misperception of an object, threat or situation  
• Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively affects the 
perception or performance of individuals  
• Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams.  
Agreement with at least one of the six conditions results in a Yes for Question 2. 
To document the assumptions used, the team notes the specific physical environment, 
individual trait, condition, or team interaction that exemplifies each statement. The result 
of this step is a list of individual conditions and physical environments that prevent 
completion of each work block. 
Question 3 focuses on supervisor influences and asks whether these would cause 
the work block to fail. There are four statements in this section that correspond to HFACS 
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nanocodes for the supervisor subcategories: supervisory violations (SV000), planned 
inappropriate operations (SP000), and inadequate supervision (SI000). An extra statement 
that addresses guidance, training and oversight is added both to include a specific example 
of improper supervision and also to later inform Step 6 of the availability of training. 
Question 3 is anchored by the phrase “Can the work block be completed” to remind the 
evaluator that only the statements that result in a work block failure are counted. This does 
not imply that the entire system will fail if each condition is satisfied. The statements 
supporting question 3 are: 
• Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies  
• Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk  
• Inappropriate or improper supervision  
• Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight.  
Agreement with at least one of the four conditions results in a Yes for Question 3. 
To document the assumptions used, the team notes the specific supervisor action that 
exemplifies each statement. The result of this step is a list of work blocks that are resistant 
to all supervisory failures; and work blocks that cannot be completed due to supervisory 
failures. 
Question 4 focuses on organizational influence and asks whether organizational 
policies and resourcing would cause the system to fail. There are four statements in this 
section that correspond to HFACS nanocodes for organizational influence subcategories: 
resource problems (OR000), personnel selection and staffing (OS000), policy and process 
issues (OP000), and climate or cultural influences (OC000). Question 4 is anchored by the 
phrase “Can the work block be completed” to remind the evaluator that only the statements 
that result in a work block failure are counted. This does not imply that the entire system 
will fail if each condition is satisfied. The statements supporting question 4 are: 
• Deficient or inadequate resources 
• Personnel selection and staffing 
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• Policy and process issues, including pace and workload, training, and 
guidance 
• Organizational culture influences on individual actions. 
Agreement with at least one of the four statements results in a Yes for Question 4. 
As objective quality evidence, the team notes the specific organizational influence that 
exemplifies each statement. The result of this step is a list of work blocks that are resistant 
to all organizational failures; and work blocks that cannot be completed due to 
organizational failures. 
The final step is to tally all the statements that would individually incapacitate each 
work block. The application of HFACS 7.0 after an accident is to detect and identify causal 
factors. During the concept review process, the same causal factors can be used proactively 
as a risk detection and mitigation strategy during system development. By matching each 
of the causal factors to system performance one at a time, none of the causal factors is 
excluded from consideration. The outcome of Step 5 informs system designers of all the 
conditions that would compromise the human functions that are required for system 
performance. 
2. CRUSH Step 6 
In CRUSH Step 6, the major contributors to failure analyzed for this step are those 
that are under the control of the system designers and program office. The result from Step 
6 is a probability of human error for each work block. This step is repeated for each human 
function required by the system, as identified in Step 3 and analyzed in Step 5. The analysis 
for each event uses the eight SPAR-H PSFs and a nominal HEP to calculate the likelihood 
of failure for the human interaction. This questionnaire prioritizes PSFs with the largest 
impact on HEP, then other factors that affect HEP to a lesser degree. The analysis includes 
both a qualitative assessment and some limited quantitative assessment of relative risk. 
HFACS subcategories associated with system design form the base of the qualitative 
assessment for system induction of human failure. 
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Step 6 uses the SPAR-H methodology because the evaluation of each performance 
shaping factor is qualitative in nature, selecting the PSF multiplier level that best describes 
the work block. The method does not require system maturity and can be applied to early 
designs. It does not rely on reference models. It does not require specialized training to 
apply the method. 
The eight SPAR-H PSFs encompass system design (ergonomics, complexity), 
logistics support (procedures, training), and operational environment. The PSFs consider 
both individual contributions to failure (training, stress, fitness for duty, experience) and 
organizational culture (training, work processes). The PSFs represent both internal factors, 
such as human attributes, skills, and abilities that are unique to individuals, and external 
factors that are associated with the task, such as the environment and equipment. 
CRUSH recognizes that some PSFs have the greater potential to increase the HEP 
than other PSFs. Available time and fitness for duty have the potential for guaranteed 
failure. It is possible for available time, procedures, ergonomics, complexity, work 
processes, and experience/training to reduce HEP (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Performance shaping factor multipliers that increase human error 
probability 
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The Step 6 questionnaire leads the analyst to consider each PSF category one at a 
time (Figure 12) because only one multiplier is selected for each PSF. The PSFs are 
presented in the order with the greatest increase to the HEP. Statements for each PSF 
category correspond to applicable HFACS subcategories as a binary approach to elicit 
system information. HFACS subcategories conditions are presented to the analyst in an 
order that reveals that the greatest multiplier for the PSF which results in a worst-case 
scenario HEP. If the event does not have the attributes that match a greater than 1 or lesser 
than one multiplier, then a multiplier of 1 is assigned for the PSF. 
 
Figure 12. CRUSH Step 6 questionnaire 
The questionnaire first prompts the analyst to answer the question, “Is the human 
mainly making decisions or taking action?” Before any failures are applied, the analyst 
Nominal HEP of 0.01 for decisions or 0.001 for action
If Yes, then automatic P(failure) = 1.0, otherwise next question
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
If No, then F = 5 and move to next category, otherwise F = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then automatic P(failure) = 1.0
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? If Yes, then T = 0.01 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? if Yes, then T = 0.1 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act? If Yes, then T = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system always be fully staffed? If No, then T = 10 and move to next category, otherwise T = 1 and move to next category
If No, then P = 50 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will procedures be complete? If No, then P = 20 and move to next category, otherwise P = 1 and move to next category
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented? If Yes then P = 0.5 and move to next category, otherwise P = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then H = 50 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise H = 1 then move to next category
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
If Yes then H = 0.5 and move to next category, otherwise H = 1 then move to next category
If Yes, then C = 1 and move to next category, otherwise next question
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply? If Yes, then C = 2 and move to next category, otherwise C = 5 and move to next category
If No, then E = 10 for decisions or E = 3 for actions and move to next category, otherwise 
next question
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
If No, then E = 10 for decisions or E = 3 for actions and move to next category, otherwise E = 
1 and move to next category
If Yes, then S = 5 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? If Yes, then S = 2 and move to next category, otherwise S = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then O = 2 for decisions or O = 5 for actions and move to next step, otherwise next 
question
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
If No, then O = 2 for decisions or O = 5 for actions and move to next step, otherwise next 
question
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good? If Yes, then O = 0.8 for decisions or O = 0.5 for actions, otherwise O = 1 then end.
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
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must decide whether the basic event resembles a diagnosis or an action. Depending on the 
analysis fidelity selected by the human reliability requirements team, it is possible that the 
event has both diagnosis and action components. The team is free to use judgment to select 
between the diagnosis and action HEPs. SPAR-H assigns diagnosis activities a NHEP of 
0.01 and action activities a nominal HEP of 0.001. Any subsequent decisions on PSF levels 
are applied to the NHEP. 
The next question focuses on fitness for duty. If an operator is unfit for duty, the 
probability of human failure is 1.0. The multi-disciplinary human reliability requirements 
team will document the threshold for human fitness required for acceptable function. 
Because human failure is guaranteed if an individual is unfit, fitness for duty is the first 
PSF assessed in Step 6. While the system design does not cause a human to be unfit for 
duty, system policies and guidelines to assess fitness for duty can exclude unfit humans 
from operating the system. The assessment of fitness for duty prompts a binary response 
to a planned aspect of the system, “Will there be protocols or controls to prevent physically 
or mentally unfit individuals from working?” If operators who are not physically or 
mentally fit are allowed to work, then the assigned HEP is 1.0 and the analysis for this 
basic event ends. If physically or mental unfit individuals are screened before working, a 
second question asks whether degraded physical mental performance is allowed: “Will 
there be protocols or controls to exclude individuals from working if injured, fatigued, or 
medicated?” The word choice in this question draws from HFACS nanocodes for the 
subcategories: physical problems (PC300), mental awareness (PC200), and state of mind 
(PC100). If the analyst answers No, then degraded performance is possible and the Fitness 
for Duty PSF multiplier, F, is set to 5. If the analyst answers Yes, then F is set to 1. If there 
is insufficient information to answer these questions, SPAR-H assigns F a nominal 
multiplier of 1. A conservative approach to assigning multipliers results in the 
identification of more system failures than if all nominal multipliers are assigned. Once 
criteria is met for a multiplier, the analyst moves to the next PSF for assessment. 
The next question focuses on the PSF of Available Time. If there is insufficient 
time to diagnose or act, the probability of human failure for the work block is 1.0. Because 
this PSF has the possibility of guaranteed human failure, it is the second PSF assessed. The 
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system affects an individual’s available time by presenting information given reaction time 
and cognition time. The assessment of available time requests a binary response to an 
assessment of each work block, “Will there be sufficient time to make a diagnosis and act?” 
If there is not enough time to make a diagnosis and act, then the assigned HEP is 1.0 and 
the analysis for this work block ends. Subsequent questions ask about the amount of time 
available to make decisions and take action. The order of questions starts with extreme 
conditions of extraneous time for which SPAR-H has provided relative time limits. If 
system design includes more than 50 times the time needed for action or at least twice the 
time needed for diagnosis, then the Available Time multiplier, T, is set to 0.01, which 
reduces the HEP. If there is not, the questionnaire asks if between 5–50 times the time 
needed will be provided. If this is true, then T is set to 0.1. If neither of these extreme 
conditions apply, the questionnaire prompts the analyst to consider if only the time needed 
is allotted for the diagnosis or action. If this is true, then T is set to 10. The final question 
for evaluating available time asks if staffing resources are guaranteed. If the system is not 
always fully staffed, then T is 10 because individuals are required to do multiple jobs within 
the allotted time. If the system will always be fully staffed and there is enough time to make 
a diagnosis and take action, then T is 1. Given the early development phase, much of this 
information may not be defined. Therefore, the multi-disciplinary human reliability 
requirements team must use their operational experience to judge whether the system 
concept provides enough time to successfully complete the function given the operational 
context of mission requirement and anticipated staffing levels.  
The third section focuses on Procedures. If procedures do not exist, individuals do 
not have written guidance on how to operate the system and must rely on training or 
memory to complete the steps correctly. The Procedures PSF is the third PSF assessed 
because SPAR-H assigns one of the highest multipliers to the absence of procedures. The 
assessment of this PSF first asks, “Will procedures exist?” If there will not be procedures 
for the event, then the assigned multiplier for Procedures, P, is 50 and the analyst moves to 
the next PSF for analysis. If procedures exist, they may be incomplete. The next evaluation 
question, “Will procedures be complete?” addresses this possibility. If procedures are 
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incomplete, then P is 20. If procedures exist and are complete, the Procedures multiplier, 
P, is 1. 
Ergonomics/HMI is the next PSF assessed in the questionnaire because the 
multiplier could be as high as 50. The questionnaire first asks, “Will HMI be misleading?” 
If HMI is misleading, the SPAR-H multiplier is for this PSF, H, is 50. While the question 
is binary, the answer is not be obvious and requires input from the multi-disciplinary human 
reliability requirements team. Yet, if a misleading HMI can be ruled out, the analyst can 
proceed to evaluate other system characteristics. A negative response to any of the 
following three questions results in a multiplier of 10 for the Ergonomics/HMI PSF: 
• Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics including 
workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, and compatibility 
with any personal protective equipment? 
• Will the system function be designed to support the human in any adverse 
physical environment?  
• Will the system function be designed to eliminate misinterpretation of 
instrumentation and visual/auditory cues and warnings? 
These additional questions correspond to HFACS nanocodes for technical 
precondition subcategories: technological environment (PE200), physical environment 
(PE100), and sensory misperception (PC500) over which the system designer has the 
ability to affect the human interface. Otherwise, the Ergonomics/HMI multiplier, H, 
defaults to 1. 
System factors that affect complexity are wide-ranging. For the Complexity PSF, 
C, multipliers range from 1 to 5. The assessment approach asks the analyst to consider a 
number of positive system attributes: 
• Tasks are prioritized for the human. 
• Diagnostic information is presented by the system. 
• Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible. 
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• Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the human in 
mind. 
• The system will always be fully staffed. 
If the team judges that one or none of the system attributes apply, the highest 
possible multiplier is assigned. If two attributes apply then C is 2. If at least three attributes 
are present in the system design, then the default multiplier, 1, is applied. These attributes 
correspond to HFACS technical precondition subcategories: technological environment 
(PE200), physical environment (PE100), and sensory misperception (PC500). Gertman et 
al. (2005) note that poor ergonomics and inadequate staffing each can increase complexity. 
Diagnostic information results in a reduced Complexity multiplier in SPAR-H. 
Lack of experience and training can increase the HEP by a factor of 10. Two 
questions are presented to the analyst to determine the Experience/Training PSF multiplier, 
E. First, the questionnaire asks, “Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on 
this system?” If operators are not trained or if trained operators do not retain knowledge, 
then E is set to 10 for decision-based tasks or 3 for action-based tasks. The evaluation level 
in SPAR-H is “low (Gertman et al. 2005).” If operators are trained but do not have 
experience, the analyst answers an additional question, “Will only operators with previous 
experience operate this system?” If some operators do not have previous experience 
working on the system, then E is 10 or 3, depending on the type of task. If all operators 
will be experienced and trained, then E is set to 1 since experience and training do not 
increase the failure probability. 
Stress, as a performance shaping factor, has three levels: extreme, high, and 
nominal. Because stress is largely an individual attribute, the word choice for this PSF asks, 
“Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?” and “Could any system 
operator ever experience high stress?” Positive responses result in assignment of 
multipliers of 5 and 2, respectively, for the Stress PSF multiplier, S. Otherwise, the 
multiplier for nominal stress, 1, applies. Responses can be based on team judgement of the 
presence of non-technical HFACS preconditions: physical environment (PE100), physical 
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problem (PC300), state of mind (PC200), sensory misperception (PC500), mental 
awareness (PC100), and teamwork (PP100). 
Work processes reflect organizational influences that affect system resources, work 
pace, and culture climate. The questionnaire first asks, “Could the organizational culture 
ever be fast paced, demand a high workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?” 
The word choice for this question considers the HFACS subcategory nanocodes: resource 
problems (OR000), personnel selection and staffing (OS000), policy and process issues 
(OP000), and climate or cultural influences (OC000). A positive response results in a Work 
Process PSF, W, assignment of 5 for action-based tasks or 2 for decision-based tasks; both 
correspond to the SPAR-H level, “poor (Gertman et al. 2005).” A negative response leads 
to a second question to determine the effect of supervisory actions on work processes. The 
question asks, “Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?” This question considers the HFACS subcategory codes: planned 
inappropriate operations (SP000) and inadequate supervision (SI000). A negative answer 
results in an assignment of 5 or 2 for W, depending on the type of task. A multiplier of 1 
is otherwise assigned for positive responses. However, if the analyst is able to positively 
answer, “Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?” a multiplier of 0.8 
can be assigned for W. The score for organization is likely the same score for all work 
blocks of human functions as the organization will apply to the entire system. 
The final part of the Step 6 questionnaire is to calculate the HEP for the human 
failure event using the nominal probability selected in the first part of Step 6 and the 
multipliers selected for each PSF: Fitness for Duty (F), Available Time (T), Procedures 
(P), Ergonomics/HMI (H), Experience/Training (E), Complexity (C), Stress (S), Work 
Processes (W). 
 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 = 𝑵𝑵𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 × 𝑭𝑭 × 𝑻𝑻 × 𝑯𝑯 × 𝑯𝑯 × 𝑯𝑯 × 𝑪𝑪 × 𝑺𝑺 × 𝑾𝑾  (1) 
Following the SPAR-H method for calculating human reliability, if three or more 
PSFs are greater than 1, then the HEP is calculated using the equation: 
 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 = 𝑵𝑵𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯×𝑭𝑭×𝑻𝑻×𝑯𝑯×𝑯𝑯×𝑯𝑯×𝑪𝑪×𝑺𝑺×𝑾𝑾
𝑵𝑵𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯×((𝑭𝑭×𝑻𝑻×𝑯𝑯×𝑯𝑯×𝑯𝑯×𝑪𝑪×𝑺𝑺×𝑾𝑾)−𝟏𝟏)+𝟏𝟏
  (2) 
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There should be an HEP calculated for each human event identified in CRUSH Step 
4. Each HEP should be between 8E-6 and 1.0. The assessment team will compile the results 
from each work block and review them in Step 7 to form recommendations to the program 
office.  
The CRUSH method can be used on a system concept during the requirements 
development phase. The method steps form the basis of a functional analysis focusing on 
system functions that are dependent on human interaction. These system functions are 
further characterized by the combinations of hardware, software, and human actions 
required to complete the function. Questionnaires that are based on the evaluation factors 
of SPAR-H and HFACS use the proposed system design and available technical 
specifications as input for the evaluation. Examining the results from all the work blocks, 
the assessment can address those blocks that have high likelihood of human error and 
whose completion is sensitive to variation in human roles. The questionnaires contain 
sufficient detail to identify system requirements that would improve the reliability of the 
system function. The method can also be used to compare design concepts or prototypes to 
anticipate human contributors to system failure. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF CRUSH TO ECDIS 
The CRUSH method was demonstrated on an existing system as part of 
verification and validation of the proposed method. The verification and validation of 
CRUSH follow the Validation Square developed by Pedersen et al. (2000). The 
Validation Square examines the “internal consistency” of the logic used within the 
method, as well as the usefulness of the method that demonstrates its “external 
relevance.” The ECDIS, a currently fielded system, was selected to demonstrate the 
CRUSH method in support of the method’s verification and validation. Though there 
are many ECDIS systems on the market, the assessment used policy documents and 
operational guidance as source documents to represent requirements for the system 
concept, instead of evaluating one manufacturer’s version of the system. This chapter 
describes the application of the CRUSH steps in a case study of how the ECDIS is used 
to support MSC navigation. 
A. FAMILIARIZATION WITH SYSTEM CONCEPT: CRUSH STEPS 1 
THROUGH 4 
The initial CRUSH steps establish the team that will assess the system, collect 
information about the system concept, identify human interfaces with the system, and 
identify individual tasks that comprise each operator function, and model combinations 
of conditions and actions that result in task failure. For this case study, the CRUSH steps 
examined the ECDIS system functions and their use within the operating policies and 
procedures of the MSC organization. 
1. CRUSH Step 1: Human Reliability Requirements Team 
In lieu of a human reliability requirements team, various subject matter experts 
served as technical advisors on this thesis to provide operational perspective into current 
ECDIS use throughout the demonstration. The technical advisors included retired Navy 
Quartermasters and directors from Military Sealift Command Headquarters. The 
technical advisors provided perspective on MSC mission tempo, hierarchy of the MSC 
officers and watchstanders, and operator training and experience. 
48 
2. CRUSH Step 2: Familiarization with ECDIS Functions 
The second step of CRUSH identified the primary function of the system. The 
revised performance standards (MSC 2006) state that the ECDIS’s primary function is 
to “contribute to safe navigation.” The scope of ECDIS defined in the revised 
performance standards includes display of electronic charts as well as the capability to 
display radar, AIS, and other data systems; facilitation of electronic chart updates; 
capability to plan and monitor routes; and use of alarms or indicators for system 
malfunction. The ECDIS is expected to perform as reliably as paper charts, which are 
the previous method of charting and navigation. Even in the revised performance 
standards, paper charts are required as a backup for ECDIS. A hierarchy view of ECDIS 
function shows the work blocks representing the ECDIS scope outline in the revised 
performance standards (Figure 13). This is a system point of view of ECDIS required 
functions. 
 
Figure 13. Hierarchy chart for the ECDIS system human functions 
Together, these ECDIS functions aid the mariner by integrating data sources and 
providing charting and radar information with alarms that call dangerous conditions to 
the mariner’s attention. This results in safer navigation.  
3. CRUSH Step 3: Human Interfaces 
Given the ECDIS functions described in the IMO MSC revised performance 
standards, CRUSH Step 3 identified the human actions and decisions that are required 
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by each system function. This necessitated an understanding of each work block as well 
as each operator role set by the MSC organization. Each work block from Figure 13 is 
decomposed into specific actions and decisions that must all be completed for the work 
block to be accomplished successfully (Table 1). 
Table 1. Decomposition of work blocks used in ECDIS concept review 
Work Block Human Function 
1 Route planning 
1.1 Plan the route 
1.2 Input the route 
1.3 Change the route 
2 Route monitoring 
2.1 View the route 
2.2 Change the view 
2.3 Interpret the data 
3 Respond to alarms/indicators 
3.1 Sense the alarm/indicator 
3.2 Understand the alarm/indicator 
3.3 Take action 
3.4 Reset the alarm/indicator 
4 Update electronic navigation charts 
4.1 Retrieve new charts 
4.2 Install new charts 
5 Act as backup to ECDIS 
5.1 Paper charts 
5.2 Paper logs 
5.3 Redundant navigation system 
5.4 Redundant sensors 
5.5 Alternate power source 
Action diagrams show the steps that comprise the ECDIS functions in Table 1. 
Route planning requires the navigation officer to plan the voyage route, input the voyage 
route, and change the route as needed (Figure 14). For route monitoring, the operator 
views the charts, changes the layers in each view, and changes the viewing scale and the 
day/night brightness settings, as needed. The operator must interpret the data viewed in 
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order to take the next navigation action, which could be to communicate the current ship 
position to the watch office or plot a paper fix (Figure 15). 
Figure 14. Action diagram for route planning 
Figure 15. Action diagram for route monitoring 
Alarms can occur during route planning and route monitoring to warn of a 
dangerous condition or system malfunction. Before an operator can act on an alarm, he 
must know that the alarm is sounding and what the alarm means (Figure 16). He must 
also be able to clear the alarm when the alarm condition is resolved. 
Figure 16. Action diagram for response to alarm 
The update of electronic charts requires the ability to retrieve the charts before 
the charts can be installed (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17. Action diagram for electronic chart update 
An action diagram was also created for ECDIS backup, which is highlighted in 
the scope of the revised performance standards. While backup systems to ECDIS are not 
controlled by ECDIS designers, having a backup to ECDIS is a performance 
requirement. The action diagram shows the different roles assumed by operators, 
supervisors, and organizations for various backup system options (Figure 18). The IMO 
considers paper charts and paper logs kept by the navigation officer to be the backup for 
ECDIS. The ship command structure is responsible for maintaining sensor systems on 
board that can be used to provide PNT information to the watchstander. The ship 
command structure is also responsible for maintaining electric power to all systems 
onboard the ship; the IMO revised performance standard includes operational 
requirements for an alternate power source. In addition, the action diagram for ECDIS 
backup models a second navigation system in the event the organization chooses to 
install a redundant ECDIS system as a backup. 
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Figure 18. Action diagram for ECDIS backup 
The tasks depicted by each work block are used multiple times during ECDIS 
operation as needed, though each block was only analyzed once in this thesis. The action 
diagrams from CRUSH Step 3 informed the fault tree logic of CRUSH Step 4 because 
fault tree success is dependent upon successful completion of all preceding work blocks. 
4. CRUSH Step 4: Functions for each human interface
In the next CRUSH step, this thesis inspected the ECDIS concept for 
combinations of hardware, software, and human failures, as well as environmental and 
technological conditions that result in failure of each work block. Successful completion 
of a required prerequisite step was modeled in the fault tree logic. For instance, 
electronic charts must be successfully retrieved before they are installed. 
The fault trees modeled human actions and conditions that, in combination with 
the system design, prevent ECDIS from achieving the desired result or completing the 
desired action. The trees focused on human failures and suboptimal knowledge, skills, 
and abilities. An operator’s lack of knowledge and recall of ECDIS operation was 
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modeled as a failure condition. An ECDIS that is unable to perform to the level needed 
by the operator, despite operating as designed, was modeled as a failure condition 
because it reflects a design flaw rather than a hardware or software failure. 
The fault trees modeled in this thesis assumed that the ECDIS system hardware 
and software operate as designed. That is, the hardware and software are 100% reliable 
and available. However, fault trees for recoverable failures, such as a redundant system 
to ECDIS or an alert to a recoverable system malfunction, included hardware failures as 
basic events that are required in the failure pathway for these trees. The Step 4 fault trees 
also assumed the data that ECDIS passes to the operator is correct. In practice, lookouts 
use binoculars to scan the environment and are in constant communication with the 
ECDIS operator. They provide redundancy by confirming information from ECDIS. The 
performance of the lookouts is outside the scope of this thesis.  
The fault trees do not include probabilities, and therefore resulting failure paths 
formed with the logic will not have any values. The fault trees are still useful because 
they detail the conditions that could result in failure. Where applicable, the basic events 
referenced HFACS conditions that are used by the CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire. The 
probability of human error is determined in CRUSH Step 6. 
a. Fault Trees for Failure to Plan Route
Figure 19 shows the fault trees for the navigation officer voyage planning role. 
Rectangles depict top level failures. Failures to update electronic charts were included 
in the fault tree logic for route planning. Though the navigation officer can update the 
electronic navigation charts at any time, MSC requires that charts be updated prior to 
each voyage (Alexander Halliday, personal communication, July 1, 2020). This ensures 
that the most recent charts are used. In order to plan the route, the navigation officer 
must be able to view the charts on the monitor and understand the information. Next, 
the navigation officer views the updated charts and inputs a route. The route can be 
changed if needed. Only failures between the ECDIS and the human interface were 
modeled. For example, if the captain has not determined the destination, the navigation 
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officer will not be able to plan the route. However, this is not a failure between the 
ECDIS and the navigation officer.  
Figure 19. Top-level fault trees for the route planning work blocks 
In this thesis, colors are used to quickly identify and differentiate information. 
Circles denote events at the lowest level of elaboration. Green circles denote basic events 
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that are successfully completed prerequisite conditions. White circles represent basic 
events which are failures or contributors to failure specific to the failure tree. Basic 
events can be further divided into increasing levels of detail, but in the context of this 
application, decomposition only adds value if the additional details can be useful in 
shaping the design requirements or improving upon the system concept. Otherwise the 
amount of details can be overwhelming to a management team. During the concept 
development phase there is no physical system architecture to evaluate, so the analysis 
may be limited until the program establishes system performance requirements and 
physical architecture. 
Triangles represent transfer gates to sub-trees that are shared by two or more top 
level events. These sub-trees have similar logic and contributors. For instance, the fault 
tree model for route planning used similar logic to the fault tree for route monitoring. 
The navigation officer must manipulate the screen views while viewing and inputting a 
route in ECDIS similar to ECDIS operators who manipulate the screen views to monitor 
the ship’s position. Transfer gate triangles in this analysis are blue. The top level events 
that the triangles reference are also blue with titles in all capital letters to better identify 
that the tree is referenced in multiple places (Figure 20). Figures 21 through 24 show 
the fault trees that are referenced in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Transfer gate fault tree for “No action or wrong action taken” 
Basic events that comprise failures of the graphical user interface (Figure 21) 
and controls and switches (Figure 22) reflect examples of design criteria from Military 
Standard 1472, Design Criteria Human Engineering (DOD 2019) that should have been 
incorporated into the ECDIS design. The basic events also reflect HFACS nanocodes: 
“Instrumentation and Warning System Issues (PE202),” “Visibility Restrictions (Not 
Weather-related) (PE203),” and “Controls and Switches are Inadequate (PE204).” 
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Figure 21. Transfer gate fault tree for “Graphical use interface” 
Figure 22. Transfer gate fault tree for “Controls/switches inadequate” 
Failure to complete or retain information from training is a sub-tree that is used 
in multiple fault trees (Figure 23). Lack of training is cited by both SPAR-H and HFACS 
as contributing to failure. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System nanocodes 
that reference training are “Technical or Procedural Knowledge Not Retained After 
Training (PC109),” “Authorized Unqualified Individuals for Task (SV004),” 
“Authorized Unqualified Individuals for Task (SI003),” and “Organizational (Formal) 
Training Is Inadequate or Unavailable (OP004).” 
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Figure 23. Transfer gate fault tree for “Training inadequate” 
Personnel unable to perform is another sub-tree that is used in multiple fault trees 
(Figure 24). This sub-tree refers to an individual’s personal factors that contribute to 
failure. These factors map to HFACS subcategories for preconditions: “Physical 
Problem (PC300),” “State of Mind (PC200),” and “Mental Awareness (PC100).” 
Figure 24. Transfer gate fault tree for “Personnel unable to perform” 
b. Fault Trees for Failure to Monitor Route
The route monitoring fault trees considered that the operator cannot view the 
charts on the ECDIS display, cannot change the view on the charts, and cannot 
understand the information on the display (Figure 25). The route monitoring fault trees 
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reference the same combinations of failures from the route planning fault tree, namely 
failures of the graphical user interface (Figure 21), controls/switches (Figure 22), 
training (Figure 23), and personnel (Figure 24). In addition, a sub-tree details how design 
of the ECDIS hardware may not be adequate for the operator (Figure 26). 
Figure 25. Top-level fault trees for the route monitoring work blocks 
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Figure 26. Transfer gate fault tree for failure of ECDIS display hardware 
design 
c. Fault Trees for Failure to Respond to Alarm/Indicator
Figure 27 shows the combinations of events associated with a failure to sense the 
alarm/indicator. The logic assumed that alarms and indicators can be audible or visual. The 
logic also assumed that if the operator is in another location, he may not hear the alarm. 
Failure to understand the alarm requires that the alarm is first sensed (Figure 28). Failure 
to take action requires that the alarm is first understood (Figure 28). This thesis assumed 
that the logic required to clear the alarm is the same as the logic to take action in 
acknowledgement of an alarm. Both require the operator to first sense and understand the 
alarm before performing a combination of steps to complete an action. 
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Figure 27. Top-level fault tree for the “Failure to sense the alarm/indicator” 
work block 
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Figure 28. Top-level fault trees for the failures to respond to alarm/indicator 
work blocks 
d. Fault Trees for Failure to Update Electronic Charts
Figure 29 shows logic combinations for the work blocks associated with updating 
electronic charts. Retrieval of electronic charts assumed that an information network is 
operational in order to facilitate download. Failures to maintain the network were included 
in the fault tree to indicate that supervisors and organizations have specific roles in the 
successful operation of ECDIS functions. Basic events referenced HFACS nanocodes for 
“Failure to Provide Adequate Manning or Staffing Resources (OS002),” “Pace of Ops-
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Tempo or Workload (OP001),” and “Failure to Remove Inadequate or Worn-out 
Equipment in a Timely Manner (OR005).” 
Figure 29. Top-level fault trees for electronic chart update work blocks 
e. Fault Trees for Failure to Backup ECDIS
The fault trees for the work blocks representing ECDIS backup systems include a 
basic event that represents unavailability of the ECDIS (Figure 30). Gray circles depict a 
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hardware unavailability which, in combination with a human failure, prevents task 
completion. 
Figure 30. Fault tree for the ECDIS backup work blocks 
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f. Fault Trees for Inadvertent Shutdown of ECDIS
An additional top-level fault tree depicts inadvertent shutdown of ECDIS either by 
inadvertent operator action or by an operator’s actions triggering an ECDIS shutdown or 
malfunction (Figure 31). This failure was not reflected in the action diagrams because the 
action diagrams reflect specific ECDIS system functions. Nevertheless, the inadvertent 
shutdown of ECDIS was captured as a work block going forward. This fault tree modeled 
both an operator action that causes ECDIS to shut down when not expected and a shutdown 
due to a recoverable system malfunction. 
Figure 31. Inadvertent ECDIS shutdown fault tree 
Because the ECDIS has been fielded for a number of years, examples of maritime 
accidents involving the ECDIS system exist. Often the accidents have more than one 
contributing factor. The Malta-flagged chemical tanker, OVIT, ran aground in 2013 after 
the officer of the watch failed to check a junior officer’s unsafe voyage plan and the crew 
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had disabled the audible alarms (Marine Accident Investigation Branch [MAIB] 2015). 
The Spanish-flagged cargo ship, MUROS, ran aground after the crew had inactivated all 
audible alarms, which they found to be a distraction (Fukuoka 2019). The alarms would 
have alerted the crew to navigational safety hazards such as shallow water. The bridge team 
also viewed the monitored the route in “standard view” which did not show sufficient detail 
for safe passage through the strait (MAIB 2017). The Nautical Institute (2009) identified a 
number of different ferry groundings that resulted from improper settings of route watch 
vectors, display scales, depth contour settings, and depth alarms. These causes were traced 
back to a lack of training because these are basic topics covered in a training course (The 
Standard Club 2015). Integration of ECDIS on a bridge was also cited in an accident. An 
officer of the watch was unable to see the visual alarms on the ECDIS to his right because 
he was watching the ship traffic directly ahead of him (Nautical Institute 2014). This 
resulted in grounding of the bulk carrier. A German-flagged cargo carrier that did not sail 
with updated electronic charts ran aground because the electronic charts did not include the 
sailing directions found on paper charts (Nautilus International 2020). These mishaps lend 
credibility to the human failures selected for the fault trees.  
The focus of CRUSH Step 4 was the identification of combinations of hardware, 
software, human, and environment conditions that could cause ECDIS function failures. 
The next CRUSH step focused specifically on the operator at the controls, the supervisor, 
and the organization. Many of the human actions and conditions assessed in Step 5 were 
included as basic events in the Step 4 fault trees. 
B. ASSESSING SYSTEM RESILIENCE: CRUSH STEP 5
The Step 5 questionnaire posed questions reflecting the major HFACS categories
Unsafe Acts, Preconditions to Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision, and Organizational 
Influences (Shappell and Wiegmann 2000). The results of the questionnaire showed the 
conditions and categories of conditions that negatively affect completion of each work 
block. The basic events from CRUSH Step 4 provided input to CRUSH Step 5. If a 
questionnaire condition reflected a fault tree basic event, was plausible, or was cited as a 
factor in an ECDIS-related accident, the answer was marked Yes for the criterion. The 
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response did not evaluate the likelihood that the condition will exist. In CRUSH Step 5, if 
the potential for the condition existed, it was presumed the condition existed; the presumed 
probability of each condition is 1.0. In the calculation of human error probability for each 
work block in CRUSH Step 6, the human reliability requirements team did not assume 
each presented condition will occur. The team drew upon previous operational experience 
to judge the likelihood of each Step 6 question. This is a key difference between Steps 5 
and 6. This is also a reason that the composition of the human reliability requirements team 
is important to the CRUSH process. 
1. CRUSH Step 5 Question 1
The Step 5 questionnaire began with a question regarding operator fitness: “Can an 
operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from being completed?” This 
question led the evaluation team to consider the influence the operator role has on system 
performance and also determine the threshold conditions for fitness for duty. The ECDIS 
requires operators to view electronic charts, manipulate the chart views to extract 
geographical information, and interpret chart data to avoid dangerous conditions. This 
thesis found that the operator’s present physical and mental fitness is required for 
successful task completion of all work blocks. 
2. CRUSH Step 5 Question 2
The second question in Step 5 asked, “Can the following unsafe acts prevent the 
work block from being completed?” The question also included sub-parts to detail the types 
of unsafe acts that could apply: 
a. Wrong decision or no decision
b. Wrong action or no action
c. Violation of known procedure.
Because navigation, charting, and steering are not automated, system success is 
dependent on human operators. The work blocks require an operator to make decisions and 
perform an action. In addition, the route planning tasks must adhere to a known safety 
management system procedure. Each of these questions was answered affirmatively for 
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route planning, route monitoring, response to alarms/indicators, and chart update. 
Inadvertent shutdown of ECDIS was proposed to result from an inadvertent operator 
action. For the ECDIS backup work block, operator performance on non-ECDIS systems 
could not be established because the extent of the involvement required by the ECDIS 
operator is unknown. 
3. CRUSH Step 5 Question 3
The third question asked, “Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent 
the work block from being completed?” This question was followed by examples of non-
technical conditions: 
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or decision
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological
disorders, or inappropriate motivation
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory, or vestibular) create a
misperception of an object, threat or situation
e. Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively affects the
perception or performance of individuals
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams.
This thesis assumed that all ECDIS equipment is located on an enclosed, climate-
controlled bridge. However, the ship is still subject to variable sea-state conditions. 
Lighting conditions on the bridge will also vary by design, maintenance, and location of 
the ECDIS. Therefore, the potential for an adverse physical environment still exists. The 
tasks are heavily dependent upon receiving visual information from a graphical user 
interface, therefore many of the conditions affecting judgement and sensory perception 
apply, including conditions that increase mental and physical stress. Sensing and 
responding to alarms require perception, comprehension and interpretation. Route 
monitoring tasks require attention over the eight-hour shift, so attention management and 
awareness are essential. As a result, Questions 3b through 3e were answered affirmatively. 
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In response to Question 3f, each task is completed by a single individual who, as the watch 
officer, has supervisory influence over other watchstanders on the bridge. While teamwork 
is not required to plan or monitor the ECDIS route, teamwork was acknowledged for 
response to alarms since the operator may coordinate the alarm response with another 
watchstander. 
4. CRUSH Step 5 Question 4 
The next question addressed supervisory influences on the ECDIS operator and 
operational use of the system: “Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent 
the work block from being completed?” This question was followed by examples of poor 
supervision: 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies 
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk 
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision 
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight. 
The assessment of supervisory conditions considered the actions of the master and 
the watch officer. The master is the navigation officer’s senior officer. Failures of the 
master as a supervisor include improper settings for watch vectors, failures to review 
personnel qualifications, and failure to review the planned voyage route. These failures 
were considered failures of oversight for Question 4d. During the voyage, the watch officer 
monitors the ECDIS in addition to his duties as watch officer. The second officer and two 
third officers each serve as watch officer for an eight-hour shift (Alexander Halliday, 
personal communication, July 8, 2020). Because it was previously judged that the ECDIS 
operator was subject to individual failures in Question 2, this thesis assumes that he could 
also commit supervisory failures as the watch officer. 
5. CRUSH Step 5 Question 5 
The final question in Step 5 focused on organizational influences that affect the 
ECDIS operator and ECDIS system support: “Can the following examples of poor 
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organizational influence prevent the work block from being completed?” This question was 
followed by examples of organizational influence: 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources
b. Personnel selection and staffing
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and workload, training, and
guidance
d. Organizational culture influences on individual actions.
Major organizational influences for ECDIS are limited to staffing and training of 
the navigation officer and maintenance of the information network to allow access to new 
electronic charts. With regard to ECDIS backup, organizational culture must support the 
use of paper charts and paper logs even as electronic charting is used as the main system 
for navigation. For additional navigation support, senior leaders must maintain the ship 
infrastructure that is includes sensor systems, alternate power sources, and installation of a 
redundant ECDIS system. 
6. CRUSH Step 5: ECDIS Resiliency
The results from CRUSH Step 5 found that completion of ECDIS functions are 
impacted by individual actions and non-technical preconditions that affect an individual’s 
judgement, perception, and awareness. The ECDIS is operated by a single individual who 
may coordinate alarm response with other watchstanders. The ECDIS is located in 
enclosed, climate-controlled area yet is subject to variable sea-state conditions. The results 
from Step 5 also found that the ECDIS operator is also subject to supervisory and 
organizational influences. The watch officer operates ECDIS in addition to performing 
supervisory duties during his shift. Organizational influences drive pace, personnel 
selection, and culture. Figure 32 shows summary results from CRUSH Step 5. Detailed 
CRUSH Step 5 results for all work blocks are located in Appendix B. 
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Figure 32. CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire results for ECDIS functions 
C. CALCULATING HUMAN ERROR POTENTIAL: CRUSH STEP 6
The Step 6 questionnaire evaluated the ECDIS system concept against the SPAR-
H performance shaping factors: available time, fitness for duty, procedures, human-
machine interface, complexity, training and experience, stress, and work processes. All 
PSF evaluation levels and multipliers used in the Step 6 evaluation are unchanged from 
those in SPAR-H (Gertman et al. 2005). The results of this step show the ECDIS attributes 
that increase the probability of human error and a calculated probability of human error for 
each task. 
1. CRUSH Step 6 Question 1: Decision and Actions
The first question of CRUSH Step 6 asked, “Is the human mainly making decisions 
or taking action?” Each work block was considered to be either a decision or an action 










5 Backup ECDIS 6 Inadvertent 
Shutdown
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being completed?
a. Wrong decision or no decision Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
b. Wrong action or no action Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
c. Violation of known procedure Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent the work block from being completed?
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator 
action or decision
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. Individual's medical or physiological condition Yes Yes Yes No No No
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial 
problems, psychological disorders or inappropriate
Yes Yes Yes No No No
d. Individual's sensory inputs (visual, auditory or
vestibular) create a misperception of an object, 
threat or situation
Yes Yes Yes No No No
e. Individual's attention management or awareness 
negatively affects the perception or performance of 
individuals
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams No No Yes No Yes No
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent the work block from being completed?
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or
oversight
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence prevent the work block from being completed?
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No No No Yes Yes No
b. Personnel selection & staffing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and 
workload, training, and guidance
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
d. Organizational culture influences on individual Yes Yes Yes No No No
1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work
block from being completed?
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decision is 0.01; the starting HEP for an action is 0.001. Work blocks for the systems that 
backup ECDIS were not scored in this section because their operation and support is 
outside the scope of ECDIS; there are no ECDIS requirements for these backup systems 
beyond that they are available. 
Table 2. ECDIS Work Blocks: Decisions and Actions 
Work Block Decision Action 
1.1 Plan the route X 
1.2 Input the route X 
1.3 Change the route X 
2.1 View the chart X 
2.2 Change the view X 
2.3 Interpret the data X 
3.1 Sense the alarm/ indicator X 
3.2 Understand the alarm/ indicator X 
3.3 Take action X 
3.4 Clear the alarm X 
4.1 Retrieve new charts X 
4.2 Install new charts X 
6 Inadvertent ECDIS shutdown X 
2. CRUSH Step 6 Question 2: Fitness for Duty
The second Step 6 question asked, “Will operators who are not physically or 
mentally fit for duty always be prevented from working?” When the answer for a work 
block was Yes, a follow-on question was presented: “Will operators always be excluded 
from duty if injured, fatigued, or while medicated?” 
Watch officer schedules on MSC ships are set at eight hours on, 16 hours off. This 
schedule allows for large blocks of time to rest and attend to personal matters, but 
watchstanders could still be fatigued. This thesis assumes that a superior officer will 
remove a person who is physically or mentally unfit. The master and chief mate do not 
stand a watch but may be on the bridge at any time. In their absence, the watch officer is 
the superior officer. Conservatively, this thesis assumes that the watch officer will work if 
he feels he is able to do so. There are three allowable level for fitness for duty regardless 
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of whether the work block is a decision or an action: “unfit,” with a probability of failure 
of 1.0; “degraded fitness,” with a multiplier of 5; and “nominal,” with a multiplier of 1 
(Gertman et al. 2005). The assessment of fitness for duty matched the criteria for a value 
of 5 because there is potential for the watch officer to be fatigued. This multiplier was 
applied across all work blocks because all operators have similar shift schedules and similar 
responsibilities. 
3. CRUSH Step 6 Question 3: Available Time
The following questions assessed whether there is sufficient time to perform each 
ECDIS task: 
• Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
• Will there be more than 50x time needed to act?
• Will there be between 5‒50 times the time needed to act?
• Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act?
• Will the system always be fully staffed?
A voyage will not occur without an approved navigation plan. The master allows 
the navigation officer sufficient time to plan and input the route, as well as update the 
necessary electronic charts prior to departure. This thesis assumed there is time to plan the 
route, input and review the route, and to make corrections before the master approves the 
planned route. For route monitoring, fixes are taken every 30 minutes during open ocean 
sail and as frequently as two minutes in restricted waters. Given that the IMO revised 
performance standard requires the standard display to be accessible by a single button push 
and route monitoring to be accomplished in a “convenient and timely manner (MSC 
2006),” there is sufficient time to cycle through the chart views multiple times for 
situational awareness. Given the ECDIS default safety contour of 30 meters, the ECDIS 
alarm setting allows the operator enough time to understand what is needed from ECDIS, 
determine how to interact with ECDIS, and perform the necessary action during a voyage 
when safety parameters are set correctly.  
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The questions evaluating available time are presented in an order such that, once a 
condition has been met, subsequent questions are not assessed because all other multipliers 
are lower than for the met condition. Insufficient time to diagnose and act results in 
automatic failure probability of 1.0. More than 50 times the time needed to act results in a 
multiplier of 0.01; between five and 50 times the time needed to act results in a multiplier 
of 0.1. If there is only enough time to diagnose or act, the multiplier is 10. If none of the 
previous conditions is satisfied, a final question asks if the work block will always be fully 
staffed. If the work block will not be fully staffed, the assigned multiplier is 10; otherwise 
the assigned multiplier for available time is 1. For all conditions, there is more than 
sufficient time needed to complete the task. The assigned multiplier for available time is 
0.1 for all work blocks because there is time to recover from errors. 
4. CRUSH Step 6 Question 4: Procedures 
The ECDIS procedures were assessed against the questions: 
• Will procedures exist? 
• Will procedures be complete? 
• Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented? 
Available procedures to assist the watch officer include master’s standing orders 
and procedures for the type-specific ECDIS. Master’s standing orders dictate ECDIS safety 
parameters to be used by the watch officer and watchstanders. The Step 6 questions asked 
whether the procedures will be complete and whether the procedures will be symptom 
oriented. This thesis made the assumptions that the procedures will be complete because 
representative operating procedures from a USCG-approved system, ECDIS 24, are 
detailed and diagnosis-oriented (Raytheon Anschütz 2014). However, the operator manual 
contents are not guaranteed to be detailed and diagnosis-oriented. According to SPAR-H, 
a multiplier of 50 is assigned if procedures do not exist; a multiplier of 20 is assigned if 
procedures are incomplete; and a multiplier of 0.5 if the procedures are diagnosis-oriented. 
The nominal multiplier of 1 was assigned to ECDIS in the absence of additional 
information, in accordance with the guidance from Gertman et al. (2005). This multiplier 
75 
was applied to all work blocks because the same set of procedures are applicable to all 
work blocks. 
5. CRUSH Step 6 Question 5: Ergonomics and Human-Machine Interface
The ECDIS system concept was evaluated against the CRUSH Step 6 questions for 
assessing ergonomics and HMI, as proposed in Chapter III: 
• Will human machine interface be misleading?
• Will the system be designed to address ergonomics including workspace
compatibility, seating, controls, switches, and compatibility with any
personal protective equipment?
• Will the system be designed to support the human in any adverse physical
environment?
• Will the system be designed to eliminate misinterpretation of
instrumentation and visual/auditory cues and warnings?
• Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Each question was evaluated separately to determine if the condition was evidenced 
in the ECDIS system concept or in the operational use of the ECDIS. Requirements for the 
human-machine interface specified in the revised performance standards include 
requirements for display, brightness, contrast, and physical controls. Watch officers toggle 
the day and night brightness and are able to zoom in for greater detail. A standard button 
on all ECDIS reverts the display to the minimum IMO-required information (IMO 2006). 
Though the ECDIS is located on an enclosed bridge that is climate controlled and protected 
from wind and rain, the entire ship is still subject to variable sea state and lighting 
conditions. Bridge personnel are not required to wear personal protective equipment. 
Considerations of how the system is physically integrated among the other equipment on 
the bridge is beyond the system designer’s control. Another question asked whether the 
system will be designed to eliminate misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/
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auditory cues and warnings. While the intention of the design is to alert the watchstander 
of safety conditions and system malfunctions, the frequency of alarms overwhelms the 
operators. Because of the frequency of alarms, operators silence alarms without 
understanding them (MAIB 2017). 
The SPAR-H evaluation levels for ergonomics and HMI allow for a multiplier of 
50 if ergonomics and HMI are “misleading or missing;” a multiplier of 10 for “poor” 
ergonomics and HMI; and a multiplier of 0.5 if ergonomics is “good (Gertman et al. 2005).” 
According to the guidance in Gertman et al. (2005), the nominal value of 1 applies if there 
is insufficient data to make an evaluation. Despite the potential for many ergonomics and 
HMI problems resulting from the physical environment, workspace integration, alarm 
frequency, and chart interpretation, only a single evaluation is permitted according to the 
SPAR-H methodology. A multiplier of 10, indicating “poor” ergonomics and human-
machine interface, was selected for all work blocks. 
6. CRUSH Step 6 Question 6: Complexity
The ECDIS system concept was evaluated against the CRUSH Step 6 criteria that 
determine complexity. From the Chapter III discussion, the questions in Question 6 are: 
• Will the system satisfy at least three of the five following conditions?
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human.
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system.
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible.
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the human in
mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed.
• Will at least two of the above conditions apply?
The revised performance standard dictates the conditions that would result in an 
alarm or indicator to alert the operator of a dangerous situation or a system malfunction. 
The revised performance standard also dictates design of display, controls, and switches. 
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The Step 6 assessment considers whether a system will be fully staffed in order to maintain 
a normal workload. Because the ECDIS is the responsibility of one person during the watch 
and not a team, this thesis assumed the ECDIS will be staffed. Because of the number of 
mishaps attributed to the disabling of frequent alarm, this thesis assumed that 
instrumentation and warning systems could present a problem for the operator. Gertman et 
al. (2005) assign “highly complex” tasks a multiplier of 5 and “moderately complex” tasks 
a multiplier of 2. In accordance with the scoring described in Chapter III, the multiplier for 
complexity was assigned a value of 1, nominal, for all work blocks because at least three 
of the five criteria applied. 
7. CRUSH Step 6 Question 7: Experience and Training 
Two questions determined the multiplier for experience and training: 
• Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this system?  
• Will only operators with previous experience operate this system? 
Training on ECDIS operations is one of the required Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers competencies for master, chief mate, and 
Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch (USCG 2018). All watch officers are trained on 
ECDIS in the course of their licensure. Training content is dictated by the IMO sub-
committee Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (IMO 2011). Schoolhouses use an 
ECDIS that is manufactured by Transas while MSC ships use a variety of ECDIS 
manufacturers, none of which are Transas (Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate 
Studies n.d.). Employers are responsible for ECDIS operators being familiar with the 
specific ECDIS model installed on the ship, but there is no requirement to have prior 
experience on the manufacturer-specific ECDIS (IMO 2011). The Certificate of 
Competency issued following completion of a 40-hour training course is the only 
documentation needed to demonstrate the “required standard of competence has been 
achieved (IMO 2017b).” Though all ECDIS operators are trained, the absence of a 
requirement to have experience on a type-specific ECDIS prior to operation drives the 
training and experience multiplier to be “low,” instead of “nominal” or “high (Gertman et 
78 
al. 2005).” Gertman et al. associated “low” with a multiplier of 10 for decisions, and a 
multiplier of 3 for actions. All work blocks were evaluated to be “low” for experience and 
training because though all operators have training requirements for licensure, the potential 
exists for all operators to be initially unfamiliar with the type-specific ECDIS on the ship. 
8. CRUSH Step 6 Question 8: Stress
Two assessment questions determined the multiplier for stress: 
• Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
• Could any system operator ever experience high stress?
Two sources of stress are operational pace and staffing levels. Military Sealift 
Command operations are more predictable than those of the Navy and of a higher tempo 
than commercial cargo ships because the MSC supports Navy operations such as refueling 
and replenishment. The MSC follows civilian commercial ship standards, including those 
for manning levels and personnel organization. The bridge personnel are typically the 
watch officer, helmsman, and lookout. The minimum staffing on the bridge is a watch 
officer and a helmsman. The bridge staff increases to as many as six people as complexity 
of operational environment increases. This thesis assumes that a majority of these 
conditions exist in the USCG-approved system and that the ship bridge will be staffed with 
at least the watch officer, helmsman, and lookout. However, in light of the MSC mission 
to support Navy operations, this thesis assumes that the work tempo for a watch officer is 
high. The duration of a ship assignment ranges from four months to the length of a career. 
Most second officers only stay for the minimum required duration of four months, as stated 
by Alexander Halliday (Force Navigator, Military Sealift Command), in discussion with 
the author, July 8, 2020. Gertman et al. (2005) set a multiplier of 2 for “high stress”; a value 
of 5 for “extreme stress”; and a nominal value of 1. Evaluation of personal stress levels of 
a typical MSC officer is outside the scope of this thesis. With regard to operational tempo 
and workload, this thesis assumed that operators may experience high stress but not 
extreme stress. The stress multiplier was assigned a value of 2 for all work blocks due to 
operational pressures.  
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9. CRUSH Step 6 Question 9: Work Processes
The final Step 6 assessment area evaluated pressures driven by organizational 
culture and leadership: 
• Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
• Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk
assessments?
• Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
Maritime mishaps often cite supervisor failure to perform real-time risk 
assessments. In this light, this thesis assumed that was possible for masters, chief mates, 
and watch officers to assume more risk than necessary to support operational tempo. For 
example, masters may fail to thoroughly review voyage plans, familiarize new crew with 
the ECDIS type on the bridge, or set safety contours that fail to allow enough time to 
respond to alarms. Gertman et al. (2005) allow for three evaluation levels of this PSF: 
“poor,” “nominal,” and “good.” Given that poor leadership contributed to previous 
maritime incidents (MAIB 2015; Fukuoka 2019), the work processes multiplier was 
conservatively assigned to be poor, with a value of 5 for actions and 3 for decisions 
(Gertman et al. 2005). 
10. CRUSH Step 6: ECDIS Human Error Probabilities
There are 13 work blocks evaluated. Detailed CRUSH Step 6 results for all work 
blocks are located in Appendix C. The results are similar for each work block because the 
tasks are all performed by the watch officer using the same equipment, the system concept 
has limited details to evaluate, and the evaluation levels provided by SPAR-H are broad. 
Two human error probabilities remain following consolidation of the results, one for 
decision tasks and another for action tasks. More than three multipliers were changed from 
the nominal value of 1 so that Equation 2 applied for both probabilities. The HEP for 
decision tasks is 0.669; the HEP for action tasks is 0.131 (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Human error probabilities for ECDIS tasks 
Performance shaping factor Decision Action 
Nominal human error probability 0.01 0.001 
Fitness for duty 5 5 
Available time 0.1 0.1 
Procedures 1 1 
Ergonomics/human-machine interface 10 10 
Complexity 1 1 
Experience and Training 10 3 
Stress 2 2 
Work processes 2 5 
Human error probability 0.669 0.131 
D. REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS: CRUSH STEPS 7 AND 8
The calculated human error probabilities were further evaluated to determine if the
findings were plausible and the extent to which performance shaping factors influenced the 
human error probabilities (Step 7). The final step (Step 8) of the CRUSH process formed 
recommendations to the program that would reduce human error probabilities and improve 
system resilience to human error. 
1. CRUSH Step 7: Review of Results
The findings from CRUSH Step 5 are that the system is largely dependent on the 
navigation officer and ECDIS operator who interact directly with the ECDIS and who are 
also subject to the decisions, resources, and pace that leadership sets for the ship. While 
the analysis from Steps 4 and 5 indicate there are a number of conditions that would prevent 
completion of each ECDIS task, in practice there is enough time to weigh decisions and 
take corrective actions if needed. Concurrent activities such as paper charts, logs, and a 
lookout fortify navigation practices so that ECDIS is not the sole navigation system on the 
bridge. However, operation and support of the backup systems is not in the scope of the 
ECDIS program. Senior leaders are responsible for these backup systems to be functional 
and available on their own ships. 
The findings from CRUSH Step 6 indicate it is likely that decision and action errors 
will be made during the lifetime of the ECDIS. The probability for decision-based tasks is 
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driven primarily by the multipliers for ergonomics/human-machine interface and training, 
and to a lesser degree by fitness for duty. The probability for action-based tasks is driven 
primarily by the ergonomics/human-machine interface, and to a lesser degree by the 
multipliers for fitness for duty and work processes. The human-machine interface is 
designed by the manufacturer, but the integration of the ECDIS on the bridge among other 
radar systems is beyond the manufacturer’s control. Given that the IMO requirements 
provide criteria to establish only a basic interface design that is common to all ECDIS 
systems, this thesis assumed that the human-machine interface could be misunderstood. 
With over 30 different types of ECDIS systems, the displays, controls, and functions are 
slightly different. For instance, methods for zooming in to the viewable area, setting the 
safety depth and safety contour, and labels for the safety zone vary between models 
(Fukuoka 2019). The potential exists for the graphics-intensive system to have visual 
indicators and warnings that will be misinterpreted. Further, while the bridge environment 
is protected from most elements, the potential exists that sea state and lighting conditions 
may vary. Because integration on the bridge is not guaranteed, the design of type-specific 
ECDIS may vary, and the ship may encounter variable environmental conditions that affect 
the operator’s perception and judgement, this thesis does not support reduction of the 
ergonomics/human interface multiplier from 10 to 1.  
Accident reports cite training failures as a reason for a number of human failures 
contributing to maritime accidents. These contributing factors range from a failure to view 
the display at a sufficient level of detail or with the correct scale, to a failure to understand 
the importance of updating electronic navigational charts prior to a voyage (MAIB 2017). 
Acquisition programs with the responsibility of creating navigation systems can invest 
resources in developing training, but recommendations for training delivery are outside the 
scope of the design effort. Fortunately, the USCG requires ECDIS training as a part of 
Officer in Charge of a Navigational Watch, master, and chief mate licensure which would 
justify a favorable training multiplier (USCG 2018). However, the performance shaping 
factor encompasses both training and experience. The International Maritime Organization 
does not require experience beyond familiarity to operate ECDIS (IMO 2017b); therefore 
the initial training and experience multiplier for a new navigation officer onboard a ship is 
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rated “poor.” This thesis offers that the training and experience multiplier can be reduced 
to 1 once an operator has gained experience using the ECDIS that is onboard the ship. 
The fitness for duty and work process multipliers also increase the human error 
probability. This thesis considered that teammates might discourage an unfit operator from 
working, but given that the ECDIS operator is typically the watch officer and the bridge is 
minimally manned, the potential exists for an injured, fatigued, or medicated person to 
work. System designers could incorporate additional prompts to confirm operator actions, 
or incorporate algorithms to detect any lags in performance. Operational pace affects the 
importance and urgency of safe navigation. Changes to mission and organizational culture 
are beyond the control of the ECDIS operator and of the ECDIS system designers, though 
more information regarding the operational tempo could aid system designers in creating 
specialized features for complex situations. 
With regard to ECDIS, there are additional opportunities to reduce human error 
probability through implementation of the system. Table 4 shows reduction to HEPs for 
decision-based tasks when selected PSFs are improved. The changes each reflect a single 
improvement to a SPAR-H evaluation level (Gertman et al. 2005) for a single PSF. Having 
an experienced operator making decision improves the experience and training level from 
“low” to “nominal,” with an associated multiplier of 1. Overall, this reduces the HEP from 
0.669 to 0.168. Improving fitness for duty one evaluation level from “degraded fitness” to 
“nominal,” changes the multiplier from 5 to 1; the overall HEP is reduced from 0.669 to 
0.288. Simultaneous improvement to experience, fitness for duty, and work process result 
in a reduced HEP of 0.020 for decision-based tasks. 
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0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Fitness for duty 5 5 1 1 
Available time 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Procedures 1 1 1 1 
Ergonomics/human-
machine interface 
10 10 10 10 
Complexity 1 1 1 1 
Experience/training 10 1 10 1 
Stress 2 2 2 2 
Work processes 2 2 2 1 
Human error 
probability 
0.669 0.168 0.288 0.020 
Table 5 shows similar reduction to HEPs resulting from improvements to key PSFs 
for action-based tasks. Referencing again the SPAR-H evaluation levels (Gertman et al. 
2005), improving work processes one level from “poor” to “nominal” reduces the 
associated multiplier to 1, and the overall HEP from 0.131 to 0.029. Improving fitness for 
duty one evaluation level from “degraded fitness” to “nominal,” changes the multiplier 
from 5 to 1, and reduces the overall HEP from 0.131 to 0.029. Simultaneous improvements 
to experience/training from “low” to “nominal,” in addition to improvements to fitness for 
duty and work process, result in a reduced HEP of 0.002 for action-based tasks. 
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0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Fitness for duty 5 5 1 1 
Available time 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Procedures 1 1 1 1 
Ergonomics/human-
machine interface 
10 10 10 10 
Complexity 1 1 1 1 
Experience/training 3 3 3 1 
Stress 2 2 2 2 
Work processes 5 1 5 1 
Human error 
probability 
0.131 0.029 0.029 0.002 
2. CRUSH Step 8: Recommendations
The ECDIS is a graphics-intensive system that integrates data from multiple types 
of electronic navigation charts and ship sensors. The navigation officer uses the system to 
plan and input a route, then the watch officer monitors the ship’s position along the route 
during the voyage. Often the navigation officer also serves as the watch officer. The 
CRUSH results confirmed that system performance is dependent upon the decisions and 
actions of a single person during its operation. As such, personal factors including the 
operator’s state of mind, and mental and physical fitness affect the successful 
accomplishment of each ECDIS function. Supervisors should continue to apply operational 
risk management to ensure that personnel are fit for duty.  
Based on the CRUSH analysis, this thesis proposes four recommendations to 
reduce human error probability. The recommendations address the causes of the highest 
PSF multipliers: ergonomics and human-machine interface, and training and experience. 
Program managers will take into account the frequency and importance of each evaluated 
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task when applying the CRUSH recommendations. One recommendation addresses system 
design; the remaining recommendations address implementation and operation of ECDIS. 
• Recommendation 1: Design alarms to be distinct from each other and 
provide technical manuals and training materials to help operators 
understand and remember the types of alarms used. The ECDIS uses the 
same data available to the operator on paper charts, but the system 
advantage is integration of the ship’s current position and AIS onto the 
display of the electronic charts. ECDIS alerts the operator of dangerous 
conditions by displaying an indicator or sounding an alarm. Because the 
IMO dictates multiple navigational conditions that require alarms, there is 
potential for operators to be confused by the frequent alarms in the already 
fast-paced environment of the ship bridge. This causes the ergonomics/
HMI multiplier to be scored “poor” with a multiplier of 10, rather than 
“nominal” with a multiplier of 1. 
The CRUSH analysis also identified contributions to human error potential in areas 
that are beyond the system designer’s control: physical integration into the workspace, 
operator experience, and staffing. Three recommendations address implementation. 
• Recommendation 2: Include guidance on a specific location for ECDIS 
on the ship’s bridge. The ergonomics of the system is dependent on 
integration of ECDIS with other equipment on the ship’s bridge. Operators 
should be able to physically interact with the system while continuing to 
maintain situational awareness of the ship’s environment. Failure to 
integrate ECDIS into the bridge layout results in an ergonomics/HMI 
evaluation of “poor” with a multiplier of 10, rather than “nominal” with a 
multiplier of 1. 
• Recommendation 3: Provide additional familiarization training to new 
navigation officers on the type-specific ECDIS. The training/experience 
multiplier currently has the same impact on the human error probability as 
the ergonomics multiplier. With experienced operators, the training and 
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experience multiplier is reduced from “low” to “nominal.” For decision-
based tasks, the multiplier is reduced from 10 to 1; for action-based tasks, 
the multiplier is reduced from 3 to 1. 
• Recommendation 4: Staff a dedicated ECDIS operator to reduce
workload from supervisory tasks. The fast pace and high workload of the
ECDIS operator, who is also the watch officer, results in an evaluation of
“poor” for work processes. Removing the additional workload from the
operator reduces this multiplier from 5 for action-based tasks to a
“nominal” value of 1.
The results of the CRUSH analysis show that system designs alone are insufficient 
to guarantee system success. Automation assists the operator by analyzing all the sensor 
data and presenting clear information with increased reliability. However, if the system is 
not properly deployed into the operator’s environment, the operator could experience 
information overload (Fukuoka 2019). Technology must also be combined with overall 
workplace design, training for normal and emergency operations, and organizational 
improvements in order to increase safety. 
E. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
The Validation Square (Pedersen et al. 2000) applies both qualitative and
quantitative evaluation of method designs. Pedersen et al. recommend that the proposed 
method qualitatively demonstrates correctness by building a foundation using other 
validated methods and ensuring that information flows from the outputs into the inputs of 
sequential steps. They suggest that usefulness of the method is established by using the 
method, documenting the implementation, and obtaining a conclusion from the results. 
This thesis has accomplished this qualitative evaluation by combining elements of two 
validated methods, SPAR-H and HFACS, as the basis of CRUSH, and creating an eight-
step process that starts with defining the human activities and conditions that are required 
for successful completion of each system function. The CRUSH steps and their 
development are detailed in Chapter III. Chapter IV describes how CRUSH is applied to 
the ECDIS as an example case.  
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Quantitative evaluation of the Validation Square examines the usefulness of the 
results from the example case and the dependency of those results on the elements proposed 
in the new method. Additional steps needed to complete quantitative validation of the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The CRUSH method proposed in this thesis combines the thoroughness of the 
mishap investigation process with the probabilities assigned by the human reliability 
assessment method. Both human reliability analysis and mishap analysis involve systems-
of-systems thinking to understand the individual, environment, and organizational factors 
that contribute to human errors in action and decision-making. Human reliability analysis 
considers the likelihood of events that have not yet occurred. Mishap investigations 
uncover contributing factors to a sequence of events that have already occurred.  
A. SUMMARY 
The research question for this thesis was to explore whether established methods 
from human reliability analysis and accident investigation could be applied to the system 
development to improve human-machine interaction that is critical to total system 
performance. Accident investigations result in specific and actionable recommendations to 
address human factors. The review of Navy collisions in 2017 found a number of 
engineering and procedural contributors, including design of helm controls and failure to 
continuously apply operational risk management (Davidson 2017). Similarly, the FAA will 
require a review of flight control systems and pilot training before the Boeing 737 MAX 
can return to service. This follows two aircraft accidents in 2018 involving the 737 MAX 
maneuvering characteristic augmentation system (Federal Aviation Administration 2019, 
2020). System design is subject to cost, facilities, and resource constraints (Langford 
2012). Operator and maintainer manning levels, skill levels, workload levels, and training 
levels are all affected by these constraints, and the effects on human performance may not 
be anticipated by the system designer. This thesis proposes a process to review the early 
system concept that incorporates functional analysis, failure mode analysis, and 
questionnaires based on human reliability and accident investigation inquiries. This thesis 
recommends this process be applied before system requirements are finalized and system 
design prototypes are completed. This process identifies design vulnerabilities similar to 
those found during mishap investigations ‒ but before any accidents occur.  
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The literature review surveyed typical activities during the requirements 
development phase where this process will be used, specifically how technical 
specifications detail functional needs to be met in a system prototype. In this early phase 
of development, a number of activities are focused on risk reduction. Technical risk 
reduction activities, such as those outlined in the NAVSEA R&ME manual (NAVSEA 
2017), do not consider all the individual, supervisory, and organizational factors that affect 
the risk contribution from humans. To address these shortcomings, the SPAR-H method 
was selected for this thesis from a survey of human reliability assessments in the literature 
review. Human error probability calculated by SPAR-H combines the evaluation of eight 
performance shaping factors and a nominal HEP. A similar survey of mishap investigation 
methods determined that the DOD HFACS was a suitable accident method to use for this 
thesis because of the investigative criteria examine interactions between people and 
technology in addition to safety culture, workplace, and organizational factors. The 
performance shaping factors and accident subcategories from SPAR-H and HFACS form 
the focal point of a method that leads requirements developers to reflect on the human roles 
and functions required by the physical system and whether the physical system impacts the 
human. 
The proposed method uses SPAR-H and HFACS to determine the consequence of 
poor human systems integration on system success and the likelihood of human error for 
each human function within the system. Both consequence and likelihood are needed to 
describe system risk. The CRUSH method focuses risk reduction efforts on the human 
roles. 
The CRUSH Step 5 questionnaire presents HFACS concepts summarizing each 
major HFACS category: unsafe acts, preconditions, supervisory actions, and organizational 
influences. Based on insights gained from the literature, the CRUSH Step 5 questions 
reflect HFACS subcategories rather than HFACS nanocodes, which have lower inter-rater 
agreement.  
The CRUSH Step 6 questionnaire presents SPAR-H factors for evaluation in the 
order of greatest impact influence on the overall HEP. The result of CRUSH Step 6 is not 
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only the HEP for a specific operator action or decision, but the multipliers for each of the 
eight factors that contribute to the HEP.  
The process concludes with a review of results and formation of recommendations 
based on the insights gained from examining system resiliency and the likelihood of human 
error. The recommendations formed in CRUSH Step 8 highlight the areas where the human 
error probability can be reduced through system design decisions. 
A demonstration applied the CRUSH process to the ECDIS. The ECDIS is used by 
commercial mariners and the U.S. Navy to plan voyages and monitor a ship’s route along 
a voyage path. The system is intended to improve safe navigation by automating the 
aggregation of ship data and charts presented to the operator and providing alerts to 
dangerous conditions. A ship’s bridge, where ECDIS is located, is dependent on 
technology, people, organizational structure, and physical environment (National Research 
Council 1990). Technical SMEs from Military Sealift Command provided operational 
context for the ECDIS during this demonstration.  
Work blocks depicted the ECDIS functions as specific decisions and actions that 
an individual would complete for each system function. The fault trees created in CRUSH 
Step 4 for each work block showed basic events such as failure to recall training and 
inadequate design of an audible alarm, which, in combination with other basic events, 
could prevent a system function from being completed. The analysis of Step 5 results 
showed that system performance is affected by the ECDIS operator and non-technical 
preconditions, with additional influence from supervisor actions and organizational 
pressures. Following completion of the Step 6 questionnaire for each work block, results 
showed that decision-based tasks have a HEP of 0.669 and that action-based tasks have a 
HEP of 0.131. The highest PSF multiplier for both decision-based and action-based tasks 
was ergonomics/HMI. For decision-based tasks, the HEP could be reduced from 0.669 to 
0.168 if operators were required to be familiar with the type-specific ECDIS on the bridge. 
For action-based tasks the HEP could be reduced from 0.131 to 0.029 if either the work 
processes or fitness for duty multiplier were improved to the next SPAR-H evaluation 
level. Four recommendations based on the CRUSH analysis addressed: 1) the ability to 
distinguish the various audible and visual alarms; 2) the integration of ECDIS on the 
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bridge; 3) familiarity of the operator with type-specific ECDIS; and 4) additional staffing 
to allow the watch officer to concentrate on supervisory duties. 
The demonstration of all eight steps of the process confirmed that the method can 
provide results similar to findings from maritime accidents investigation reports. 
Additional demonstrations of this method at later system development phases and on other 
MSC bridge systems are useful to support findings from this concept review and to gain 
confidence in the method. 
B. DISCUSSION 
1. Development of the CRUSH Process 
Definitions of individual work tasks and failure logic are important to put the results 
in context of overall system performance. The evaluation of the system concept focuses on 
individual functions that require human interaction. Therefore, the process begins with 
guidance on how the human interactions are identified. The process continues with 
decomposition of identified human functions into tasks. Where task sequence is important, 
the sequence is also captured in the action diagrams for CRUSH Step 3. Failure analyses 
of each work block in CRUSH Step 3 comprise the fault tree logic in CRUSH Step 4. The 
smaller work blocks are used to inspect human integration with other system components, 
such as hardware and software, with other systems, and under organizational and physical 
environment constraints. 
The initial intention of this thesis was to create an assessment whose findings are 
used to recommend specific physical design requirements be included in the technical 
specifications. However, addressing the findings of the assessment solely through updates 
to the technical specifications limits the ways the findings could be used to reduce risk 
reduction. Program managers define priorities in the system development cycle and devote 
resources in accordance with those priorities. Program managers use risk-based decision 
making to decide which activities to prioritize and resource. Step 5 of the CRUSH method 
identifies the extent to which individual acts, preconditions, supervisory actions, or 
organizational influence have impact on the system functions. Step 6 of the CRUSH 
method is used to estimate the likelihood that the human will err while performing a 
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necessary system function. Together consequence and likelihood, as assessed using the 
CRUSH method, inform the program manager of any human contributions to risks that 
were not previously anticipated by the system concept. The program manager can choose 
to accept the risks identified through use of the method, or mitigate risks using various 
approaches throughout the life cycle. Mitigations may include, but are not limited to, 
development of additional diagnostic information in the graphical user display, detailed 
procedures in the technical manual for system recovery, instructions for integrating the 
physical system into the operator’s workspace, and recommendations for minimum 
staffing and training levels for the system being designed. 
While deconstructing the evaluation levels of SPAR-H and the nanocodes from 
HFACS, limitations of each method became evident. The HFACS accident investigation 
method has 109 nanocodes and each is considered equally important in the application of 
the method. Instead of 109 nanocodes, Step 5 uses the 17 HFACS subcategories to which 
the nanocodes belong. This questionnaire provides the analyst with an overall 
understanding of the unsafe acts, preconditions, supervisory actions, and organizational 
influences that apply to the system. All Step 5 responses are considered equal, meaning 
that each Yes response to a Step 5 question indicates that a system function will not be 
completed. In contrast, the SPAR-H method has eight performance shaping factors, each 
with different numbers of evaluation levels and different ranges of multipliers. For 
example, Procedures has five evaluation levels ranging from 0.5 to 50, while Stress has 
three levels ranging from 1 to 5. Within each PSF, levels are not evenly distributed; the 
five Procedures multipliers are 0.5, 1, 5, 20, and 50. It is not possible to assign a Procedures 
multiplier between 20 and 50. Similarly, the only available multipliers for Ergonomics/
HMI are 0.5, 1, 10, and 50. This limits the fidelity of the Step 6 evaluation. 
The CRUSH process is designed to be used by a diverse team of subject matter 
experts representing human factors, operational, and engineering expertise. Initially, the 
analysis was intended to be simple enough and descriptive enough to be completed by one 
person, but the analysis is enriched through the professional experiences of the team 
members. Each team member brings a different understanding of the system concept, 
human capabilities, and operational use and constraints. While the process steps are still 
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simple enough to be completed by one person, an unintended benefit from the team 
approach is that the quality of the inputs to the questionnaires is improved, and the 
recommendations are supported by a consensus of the human factors, engineering, and 
operational representatives. 
2. Limitations of the Final CRUSH Process 
The CRUSH process incorporates the major parts of SPAR-H and HFACS, namely 
the calculation of human error probability supported by the subcategories defined in 
HFACS. The SPAR-H human reliability method also includes additional calculations to 
account for dependencies beyond analysis of a single task. The error probability increases 
when one task is dependent upon the successful completion of a preceding task, or if 
multiple tasks are completed by the same crew with similar individual factors and similar 
training. Inclusion of dependencies is outside the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the tasks are evaluated independently with no dependence because the focus is 
on the evaluation factors that result in the HEP. 
Six of the eight performance shaping factors have multiplier levels that result in 
decreased human error probability (Figure 33): available time, complexity, work processes, 
ergonomics and HMI, procedures, and experience and training. Three of them, available 
time, work processes, and procedures, are incorporated into the CRUSH Step 6 
questionnaire. The detail needed to assess quality of training materials and applicability of 
previous operator experience level may not yet exist when the CRUSH process is applied 
the first time. The available time multiplier can be further revised after evaluating the 
human-machine interface of prototype designs. A detailed assessment of complexity and 
ergonomics is not yet possible at this stage when physical prototypes do not yet exist. In 
cases where there is insufficient information to make an evaluation, the default SPAR-H 
multiplier is 1. This neutral multiplier does not increase or decrease the HEP. When the 
CRUSH process is repeated in future development stages, additional system detail will be 
available for a more robust evaluation of current system design. Usability studies 
performed later in system development can examine whether ergonomics features reduce 
complexity. Future work on this topic can propose alternate multiplier scores to account 
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for the relationship between ergonomics and complexity to determine if reductions to both 
multipliers are warranted. 
 
Figure 33. Performance shaping factor multipliers that decrease human error 
probability 
In this thesis, the performance shaping factors are not further manipulated to 
account for the relationships between two or more performance shaping factors. For 
example, multiple performance shaping factors affect the available time. Poor ergonomics 
can result in inefficiency of movement, which will require more time to complete. Stress 
affects the operator’s ability to recall. An operator can use experience to quickly diagnose 
an off-normal condition. The strength of the relationships between evaluated factors is not 
used in this thesis to further adjust the calculated HEP beyond its initial scoring. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis recommends that acquisition programs use the CRUSH process during 
requirements development to implement specific recommendations for human 
considerations into the system design. Results from the method show where the system 
concept is most sensitive to human actions and decisions and the nature of those 
vulnerabilities. The method can be completed without proprietary software and with a 
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subset of the group of engineers that are assembled to write system requirements. This aids 
the usability and acceptance of the method and removes a barrier from implementation 
DOD-wide. Further, the individual analyses in Steps 2 through 4 can reuse other 
engineering analyses as input for these steps. The method can accept existing functional 
analyses developed for reliability analysis, human factors analysis, maintenance and 
logistics support, as input for the method steps. The analyses from process Steps 3 through 
6 can support development of use cases, which also support requirements development, 
and can influence preparation for test and evaluation such as selection of test personnel and 
training in a later phase (Blanchard and Fabricky 2011; Buede and Miller 2016). The results 
from CRUSH can also be applied to a feasibility analysis that examines performance, 
effectiveness, maintenance, and cost criteria to determine the practicality of a system. 
This thesis recommends that the program manager update the fault tree basic events 
with the resulting human error probabilities. The HEPs should be combined with the failure 
rates of the hardware and software failure to determine which failure scenarios are most 
likely. The logic may identify that multiple human errors are required before the system 
fails. The approach to examine the contribution of each PSF to the single HEP is sufficient 
for the purposes of the concept review. Used in this way, the system developers can focus 
on the factors that result in the most events with the highest probability of occurrence. If 
the human action or decision is a single-point failure or is identified as a common-cause 
failure in the fault trees, the probability calculated in Step 6 is more indicative of the 
probability of system failure. 
In lieu of recommendations for new or revised technical specifications, the results 
of this multi-step process inform the program manager of current risk and risk drivers with 
respect to human systems integration. The program manager can choose to accept the risk 
of the concept as designed and evaluated or implement the specific recommendations that 
result from the evaluation. An example recommendation from CRUSH Step 5 is to include 
a backup or redundant function where the function is deemed critical and susceptible to 
human error. An example recommendation from CRUSH Step 6 is to propose additional 
personnel to offset workload and reduce complexity.  
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The CRUSH process can evaluate from the conceptual design the key factors 
important to human integration that increase reliability. This method is designed to be used 
immediately following concept development with the limited details regarding the physical 
architecture. A manufacturer can gain a competitive edge by making smart design choices 
that increase human reliability and usability. The CRUSH process can quantify the impacts 
of the design choices. As a risk assessment tool, the full method is applicable also to the 
design of user test events, both of proposed physical designs and completed prototypes, in 
conjunction with operational testing.  
D. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis recommends that validation of the CRUSH method continues in future 
work. The Validation Square (Pedersen et al. 2000) describes a path to validation that 
evaluates effectiveness and efficiency of the new method. According to Pedersen, 
effectiveness begins with acceptance of individual constructs that form the new method 
and that the method is consistent; efficiency shows usefulness of the method and that any 
usefulness is due to the method itself. To build confidence in CRUSH, this thesis selected 
two validated assessment tools as foundations for the proposed method. The work in this 
thesis then described how the outputs of each CRUSH step were used as inputs into the 
next step. Next, this thesis used the ECDIS for a demonstration example. To further study 
the internal consistency of the CRUSH method, specifically Steps 5 and 6, a human 
subjects test is proposed to determine the inter-rater agreement between teams using the 
CRUSH method on an early system concept. Teams of raters would use the CRUSH 
process questionnaires on the same work blocks to determine if agreement between the 
teams’ results is statistically significant. At least 10 teams of raters are needed for statistical 
significance. For consistency, each team would complete the Step 5 and Step 6 
questionnaires for the same work blocks. The teams will also be asked to form 
recommendations based on their own interpretation of their results. The teams will have 
access to the same information sources describing the system concept, including fault trees, 
in order to minimize the variations of assumptions used by each team. The results of interest 
from each team would be the major influences upon the system, as described by the Step 5 
questionnaire criteria; and the multiplier and final HEP determined by the Step 6 
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questionnaire. In addition to inter-rater agreement for the questionnaires, an analysis of the 
results can also show if the background and experience of each team member impacts the 
results. An analysis of the results may also show that while questionnaire scoring may 
differ between teams, the final recommendations are similar. These test plans are subject 
to institutional review board approval. 
The next step in the Validation Square is to show that the results are useful and that 
the usefulness of the results is derived from the method used. A demonstration on a state-
of-the art ECDIS to compare the final ECDIS product with the recommendations from the 
ECDIS system concept evaluation, is out of scope for this thesis effort. A follow-on study 
is proposed to examine the effects of recommendations from this method to determine 
whether they are impactful against program metrics for mission performance, reliability, 
or cost-savings, for example. As there are a number of ECDIS systems available on the 
market, the CRUSH method can be applied to a variety of designs to determine which 
designs are the most human-centered and then compare the technical and business cases 
for each.  
Additional demonstrations on systems of varying platform size and with varying 
numbers of operators would increase confidence in the method to gain acceptance for this 
method. The additional tests would help prove both the internal consistency of this method 
given a variety of example systems and would also add to the metrics collected to show 
that the system has useful results for a program. Success stories from programs who have 
implemented the method would benefit acceptance. 
The CRUSH method described in this thesis successfully demonstrates that SPAR-
H and HFACS can be used as the foundation to a process that takes a system concept as 
input and returns recommendations that improve human integration. The demonstration of 
this method on ECDIS is a first step towards verification and validation of the method. 
Follow-on studies by multiple assessment teams and on multiple system platforms is 
required for full validation and deployment of the method as a risk reduction tool. 
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APPENDIX A. CRUSH QUESTIONNAIRES 




a. Wrong decision or no decision
b. Wrong action or no action
c. Violation of known procedure
Yes/No
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or decision
b. Individual's medical or physiological condition
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological 
disorders or inappropriate motivation
d. Individual's sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) create a 
misperception of an object, threat or situation
e. Individual's attention management or awareness negatively affects the 
perception or performance of individuals
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams
Yes/No
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight
a. Deficient or inadequate resources
b. Personnel selection and staffing
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and workload, training, and 
guidance
d. Organizational culture influences on individual actions
1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from being 
completed?
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence prevent the 
work block from being completed?
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent the work block from 
being completed?
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent the work block from 
being completed?
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being completed?
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B. CRUSH STEP 6 
 
 
Nominal HEP of 0.01 for decisions or 0.001 for action
If Yes, then automatic P(failure) = 1.0, otherwise next question
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
If No, then F = 5 and move to next category, otherwise F = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then automatic P(failure) = 1.0
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? If Yes, then T = 0.01 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? if Yes, then T = 0.1 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act? If Yes, then T = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system always be fully staffed? If No, then T = 10 and move to next category, otherwise T = 1 and move to next category
If No, then P = 50 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will procedures be complete? If No, then P = 20 and move to next category, otherwise P = 1 and move to next category
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented? If Yes then P = 0.5 and move to next category, otherwise P = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then H = 50 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
If No, then H = 10 and move to next category, otherwise H = 1 then move to next category
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
If Yes then H = 0.5 and move to next category, otherwise H = 1 then move to next category
If Yes, then C = 1 and move to next category, otherwise next question
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply? If Yes, then C = 2 and move to next category, otherwise C = 5 and move to next category
If No, then E = 10 for decisions or E = 3 for actions and move to next category, otherwise 
next question
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
If No, then E = 10 for decisions or E = 3 for actions and move to next category, otherwise E = 
1 and move to next category
If Yes, then S = 5 and move to next category, otherwise next question
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? If Yes, then S = 2 and move to next category, otherwise S = 1 and move to next category
If Yes, then O = 2 for decisions or O = 5 for actions and move to next step, otherwise next 
question
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
If No, then O = 2 for decisions or O = 5 for actions and move to next step, otherwise next 
question
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good? If Yes, then O = 0.8 for decisions or O = 0.5 for actions, otherwise O = 1 then end.
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
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APPENDIX B. ECDIS STEP 5 QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. ROUTE PLANNING ASSESSMENT 
 
  1 Route Planning  
  1.1 1.2 1.3  









1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from 
being completed? 
Yes Yes Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being 
completed? 
      
 
a. Wrong decision or no decision Yes Yes Yes  
b. Wrong action or no action Yes Yes Yes  
c. Violation of known procedure Yes Yes Yes 
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
      
 
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or 
decision 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition Yes Yes Yes  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, 
psychological disorders or inappropriate motivation 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) 
create a misperception of an object, threat or situation 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively 
affects the perception or performance of individuals 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams No No No 
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent the work 
block from being completed? 
      
 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies Yes Yes Yes  
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk Yes Yes Yes  
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes Yes  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight Yes Yes Yes 
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence prevent 
the work block from being completed? 
      
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No No No  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes Yes Yes  
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and workload, 
training, and guidance 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
d. Organizational culture influences on individual actions Yes Yes Yes 
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B. ROUTE MONITORING ASSESSMENT 
 
  2 Route Monitoring  
  2.1 2.2 2.3  








1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from 
being completed? 
Yes Yes Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being 
completed? 
      
 
a. Wrong decision or no decision Yes Yes Yes  
b. Wrong action or no action Yes Yes Yes  
c. Violation of known procedure Yes No No 
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent the work 
block from being completed? 
      
 
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or 
decision 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition Yes Yes Yes  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, 
psychological disorders or inappropriate motivation 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) create 
a misperception of an object, threat or situation 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively 
affects the perception or performance of individuals 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams No No Yes 
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent the work 
block from being completed? 
      
 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies Yes Yes Yes  
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk Yes Yes Yes  
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes Yes  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight Yes Yes Yes 
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence 
prevent the work block from being completed? 
      
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No No No  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes Yes Yes  
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and workload, training, 
and guidance 
Yes Yes Yes 
 




C. ALARM AND INDICATOR RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 
 
  3 Alarms and Indicators  
  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4  










1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent 
the work block from being completed? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work 
block from being completed? 
        
 
a. Wrong decision or no decision No No Yes Yes  
b. Wrong action or no action No No Yes Yes  
c. Violation of known procedure No No Yes Yes 
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions 
prevent the work block from being completed? 
        
 
a. Physical environment negatively affects 
operator action or decision 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition Yes Yes Yes Yes  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial 
problems, psychological disorders or 
inappropriate motivation 
No Yes Yes No 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or 
vestibular) create a misperception of an object, 
threat or situation 
Yes No No Yes 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or 
awareness negatively affects the perception or 
performance of individuals 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and 
teams 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision 
prevent the work block from being completed? 
        
 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or 
policies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control 
risk 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes Yes Yes  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, 
training, or oversight 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5. Can the following examples of poor 
organizational influence prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
        
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No No No No  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes Yes Yes Yes  
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and 
workload, training, and guidance 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
d. Organizational culture influences on 
individual actions 
No No No No 
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D. ELECTRONIC CHART UPDATE ASSESSMENT 
 
  4 Update charts  
  4.1 4.2  




1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from being 
completed? 
Yes Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being 
completed? 
    
 
a. Wrong decision or no decision Yes Yes  
b. Wrong action or no action Yes Yes  
c. Violation of known procedure Yes Yes 
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
    
 
a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or decision Yes Yes 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition No No  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological 
disorders or inappropriate motivation 
No No 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) create a 
misperception of an object, threat or situation 
No No 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively affects the 
perception or performance of individuals 
Yes Yes 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams No No 
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
    
 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies Yes Yes  
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk Yes Yes  
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight Yes Yes 
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence prevent the 
work block from being completed? 
    
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources Yes No  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes Yes  








E. ECDIS BACKUP ASSESSMENT 
 
  5 Reliability, Availability, Backup  
  5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5  













1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent 
the work block from being completed? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work 
block from being completed? 
          
 
a. Wrong decision or no decision No No No No No  
b. Wrong action or no action No No No No No  
c. Violation of known procedure No No No No No 
3. Can the following non-technical preconditions 
prevent the work block from being completed? 
          
 
a. Physical environment negatively affects 
operator action or decision 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition No No No No No  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial 
problems, psychological disorders or 
inappropriate motivation 
No No No No No 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or 
vestibular) create a misperception of an object, 
threat or situation 
No No No No No 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or 
awareness negatively affects the perception or 
performance of individuals 
Yes Yes No No No 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and 
teams 
Yes Yes No No No 
4. Can the following examples of poor supervision 
prevent the work block from being completed? 
          
 
a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or 
policies 
Yes Yes No No No 
 
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk Yes Yes No No No  
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision Yes Yes No No No  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, 
training, or oversight 
Yes Yes No No No 
5. Can the following examples of poor 
organizational influence prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
          
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No No Yes Yes Yes  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes Yes No Yes No  
c. Policy and process issues, including pace and 
workload, training, and guidance 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
 
d. Organizational culture influences on individual 
actions 
No No No No No 
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F. INADVERTENT ECDIS SHUTDOWN 
 
  6 Inadvertent 
Shutdown  
  6  
  Inadvertent ECDIS 
shutdown 
1. Can an operator who is unfit for duty prevent the work block from being completed? Yes 
2. Can the following unsafe acts prevent the work block from being completed?    
a. Wrong decision or no decision No  
b. Wrong action or no action Yes  
c. Violation of known procedure No 




a. Physical environment negatively affects operator action or decision No 
 
b. Individual’s medical or physiological condition No  
c. Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological 
disorders or inappropriate motivation 
No 
 
d. Individual’s sensory inputs (visual, auditory or vestibular) create a 
misperception of an object, threat or situation 
No 
 
e. Individual’s attention management or awareness negatively affects the 
perception or performance of individuals 
Yes 
 
f. Interactions among individuals, crews, and teams No 




a. Supervisor willful disregard of instructions or policies No  
b. Supervisor failure to recognize and control risk No  
c. Inappropriate or improper supervision No  
d. Supervisor failure to provide guidance, training, or oversight Yes 
5. Can the following examples of poor organizational influence prevent the work block 
from being completed? 
  
 
a. Deficient or inadequate resources No  
b. Personnel selection and staffing Yes  




d. Organizational culture influences on individual actions No 
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APPENDIX C. ECDIS STEP 6 QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. ROUTE PLANNING HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY 
 













Decision 0.01 Action 0.001 Action 0.001
N N N
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
N 5 N 5 N 5
N N N
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? N N N
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? Y 0.1 Y 0.1 Y 0.1
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act?
Will the system always be fully staffed?
Y Y Y
Will procedures be complete? Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented?
N N N
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
Y Y Y
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
N 10 N 10 N 10
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply?
Y Y Y
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
N 10 N 3 N 3
N N N
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? Y 2 Y 2 Y 2
Y 5 Y 5 Y 5
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
1 Route Planning
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B. ROUTE MONITORING HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY 
 













Decision 0.01 Action 0.001 Decision 0.01
N N N
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
N 5 N 5 N 5
N N N
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? N N N
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? Y 0.1 Y 0.1 Y 0.1
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act?
Will the system always be fully staffed?
Y Y Y
Will procedures be complete? Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented?
N N N
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
Y Y Y
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
N 10 N 10 N 10
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply?
N 10 N 3 N 10
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
N N N
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? Y 2 Y 2 Y 2
Y 5 Y 5 Y 5
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
2 Route Monitoring
109 
C. ALARMS AND INDICATORS HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY  
 





















Decision 0.01 Decision 0.01 Action 0.001 Action 0.001
N N N N
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
N 5 N 5 N 5 N 5
N N N N
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? N N N N
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? Y 0.1 Y 0.1 Y 0.1 Y 0.1
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act?
Will the system always be fully staffed?
Y Y Y Y
Will procedures be complete? Y 1 Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented?
N N N N
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
Y Y Y Y
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
N 10 N 10 N 10 N 10
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Y 1 Y 1 Y 1 Y 1
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply?
Y Y Y Y
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
N 10 N 10 N 3 N 3
N N N N
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? Y 2 Y 2 Y 2 Y 2
Y 5 Y 5 Y 5 Y 5
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
3 Alarms and Indicators
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D. CHART UPDATE HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY  
 
 













Action 0.001 Action 0.001
N N
Will operators always be excluded from duty if injured, fatigued, 
or while medicated?
N 5 N 5
N N
Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? N N
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? Y 0.1 Y 0.1
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act?
Will the system always be fully staffed?
Y Y
Will procedures be complete? Y 1 Y 1
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented?
N N
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
Y Y
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
N 10 N 10
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Y 1 Y 1
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply?
Y Y
Will only operators with previous experience operate this 
system?
N 3 N 3
N N
Could any system operator ever experience high stress? Y 2 Y 2
Y 5 Y 5
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
4 Update charts
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Will there be more than 50x time needed to act? N
Will there be between 5x-50x time needed to act? N
Will there be only enough time to diagnose or act? N
Will the system always be fully staffed? Y 1
Y
Will procedures be complete? Y 1
Will procedures be symptom or diagnosis oriented?
Y
Will the system function be designed to address ergonomics 
including workspace compatibility, seating, controls, switches, 
and compatibility with any personal protective equipment?
Y
Will the system function be designed to support the human in 
any adverse physical environment? 
N 10
Will the system function be designed to eliminate 
misinterpretation of instrumentation and visual/auditory cues 
and warnings?
Will the controls, switches, communication equipment, personal 
equipment, and workspace be adequate?
Y 1
a. Tasks are prioritized for the human Y
b. Diagnostic information is presented by the system
c. Controls and switches are clear and easily accessible
d. Instrumentation and warning systems are designed with the 
human in mind.
e. The system will always be fully staffed
Will at least 2 of the above conditions apply?
Y




Could any system operator ever experience high stress? Y 2
Y 5
Will every supervisor perform and communicate continuous risk 
assessments?
Will organizational culture always be exceptionally good?
6 Inadvertent shutdown
8. Could any system operator ever experience extreme stress?
9. Could the organizational culture ever be fast paced, demand a high 
workload, or be understaffed for the amount of tasking?
2. Will operators who are not physically or mentally fit for duty always be 
prevented from working?
3. Will there be insufficient time to diagnose and act?
4. Will procedures exist?
5. Will human machine interface be misleading?
6. Will the work block satisfy at least 3 of the 5 following conditions?
7. Will all operators be trained on and retain knowledge on this work block?
1. Is the human mainly making decisions or taking action?
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